

PHENOMENOLOGY OF PRACTICE
IN PRACTICE.
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

KLAIPĖDA UNIVERSITY, 2017

ARTICLES FOR THIS ISSUE WERE COLLECTED AT THE
FIRST INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC-PRACTICAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL
CONFERENCE AND WORKSHOP:
"PHENOMENOLOGY OF PRACTICE IN PRACTICE. INTERNATIONAL
INTERDISCIPLINARY
CONFERENCE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN HUMAN SCIENCES"

KOLPING UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES, KAUNAS
22 - 24 SEPTEMBER, 2016

ALL ARTICLES WERE SELECTED VIA A DOUBLE BLIND PEER REVIEW PROCESS
BY MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE:

LITHUANIA
SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE
PROF. DR. LIUDMILA RUPŠIENĖ
DR. ALEKSANDRA BATUCHINA
DR. AUŠRA FOKIENĖ
DR. LIJANA NAVICKIENĖ

EDITING: ALEKSANDRA BATUCHINA, AGNĖ KUDARAUSKIENĖ, GIEDRĖ
TAMOLIŪNĖ
LAYOUT: GIEDRĖ TAMOLIŪNĖ
GRAPHIC DESIGN: GIEDRĖ TAMOLIŪNĖ

KLAIPĖDA UNIVERSITY, 2017

ISBN 978-9955-18-990-9

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION.....	1
LIUDMILA RUPŠIENĖ, AGNĖ KUDARAUSKIENĖ, ALEKSANDRA BATUCHINA	
CHAPTER ONE.....	3
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA AND EVENT ORIENTED EDUCATION	
GINTAUTAS MAŽEIKIS	
CHAPTER TWO.....	22
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND ART: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH	
GIEDRE STRAKSIENE, ALEKSANDRA BATUCHINA, ODED BEN HORIN	
CHAPTER THREE.....	33
APPLICATION OF GIORGI'S EIDETIC PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS	
CRISTIANA BARBIERATO	
CHAPTER FOUR.....	48
CONSCIENCE AS <i>THE OTHER</i> : THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ACTING CONSCIOUSNESS AND JUDGING CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE NOVEL <i>BLŪDAS</i> BY JULIJONAS LINDĖ-DOBILAS	
SKAISTĖ BARKUTĖ	
CHAPTER FIVE.....	59
PEDAGOGICAL ETHICS IN THE LIGHT OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL REFLECTION: A FEW INSPIRATIONS FROM MAX VAN MANEN AND POLISH PHENOMENOLOGICAL PEDAGOGY	
MARTA KRUPSKA	
CONTRIBUTORS.....	69

INTRODUCTION

LIUDMILA RUPŠIENĖ, AGNĖ KUDARAUSKIENĖ,
ALEKSANDRA BATUCHINA

Phenomenology is considered a philosophical perspective, but it is an approach to qualitative methodology, too. Thus it is much more complicated than a simple collection of methods and techniques, and it has recently become a popular inquiry for getting to know the human lifeworld. This type of methodology originates from the philosophical phenomenology school that was created in the 19th century in response to scientism. E. Husserl is considered to be the pioneer of phenomenology; his ideas were later spread by such philosophers as M. Heidegger, J. P. Sartre, M. Merleau-Ponty. In its lifetime, phenomenology has developed into a dozen of different directions and variations that are based on the ideas and works of various philosophers and scientists. However, the main landmark of all researchers of all directions is the diverse experience of this phenomenon and its expression in the stories that best suit the content of human experience (van Manen, 2007).

The exclusiveness of phenomenology, which allowed it to become one of the strategies for qualitative research, is that it criticised the aspirations to investigate human beings with methods of quantitative nature sciences. After all, a human being experiences such internal experiences that quantitative methods of nature sciences are incapable to explore, identify the exact causes of them, nor provide solutions. Certain subjects and experiences of human life reveal themselves only through a sensitive and open investigation - such as a phenomenological study. Moreover, phenomenology as methodology tries to abstain from philosophical reasoning and idealisation, trying to reveal the “practical” side of the phenomenon.

Any phenomena in the world is best explained by what they mean to a human being. Philosopher Alfred Schutz, who attempted to relate phenomenology to the social world and social sciences, says:

The world of nature, as explored by the natural scientist, does not ‘mean’ anything to the molecules, atoms and electrons. But the observational field of the social scientist – social reality – has a specific meaning and reference structure for the human beings living, acting and thinking within

it (1962, pp. 59).

After all, the meaning of freedom is revealed by a person who is experiencing freedom, love is explained by the one who loves, the essence of the learning process reveals itself only when someone is in the learning process and can recall the meaningful moments. In other words, the phenomenon can be seen only through human experience. As a result, phenomenology begins with the content of the human consciousness, which indicates whether the phenomenon under investigation exists at all, and if so, what the essence of it is. Each of us has different experiences of freedom, love, learning, sickness, moods; all these different experiences open up the phenomenon in the widest sense and allow us to get closer to its essence.

Therefore, phenomenological methodology is a matter of **describing**, and not explaining or analysing. A human being is not the outcome or the meeting-point of numerous causal agencies, which determine his bodily or psychological make-up. Research based on phenomenological methodology does not offer us an effective theory, conclusions nor solutions to certain problems. But it gives us the opportunity to know the essence of phenomena, which in other cases could remain undisclosed as a result of preconceptions or a hypothesis. We cannot perceive a human being as nothing but a bit of the world, a mere object of biological, psychological or sociological investigation. All knowledge of the world, even scientific knowledge, is gained from our own particular point of view or from some experience of the world without which the explanation of science would be meaningless (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Phenomenology always begins with the living world, with the everydayness of a human being and his natural experiences. Thus, phenomenology seeks a deeper understanding of these experiences and asks – “What is this experience like?”.

“The Phenomenology of Practice in Practice” is an initiative of the group of researchers based in Klaipėda University, Vytautas Magnus University, and Kolping University of Applied Sciences in Lithuania, who have a research interest in qualitative phenomenological inquiries. This book collects the research work gathered at the first international scientific-practical phenomenological conference and workshop.

“Phenomenology of Practice in Practice. International Interdisciplinary Conference of Phenomenological Research in Human Sciences”. This event provided the arena for professionals and academics from different human science areas, including education, philosophy, business, social work, literature, psychology, and others, to share experiences and challenges of using phenomenology inquiry in their research.

CHAPTER ONE

PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF PROPAGANDA AND EVENT-ORIENTED EDUCATION

PROF. DR. GINTAUTAS MAŽEIKIS
VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY, LITHUANIA

Abstract: The article uses phenomenological approach for the analysis of propaganda in the educational processes. It interprets the paradigms of critical pedagogy as well as open education and presents the idea of learning through participation in alternative events. The idea is not to completely reject propaganda as an instrument of mobilisations of ideologically motivated subjects, but to explain the transgression of the condition of de-subjection into strong mobilisation and vice versa. The main phenomenological questions are: What does de-subjection (de-personalisation) mean to our social and political experiences? What are the differences between experiences of multiplicity of “con-dividuals” and the mobilisation of “in-dividuals”? Could the idea of de-personalised multiplicity be realised in the event-oriented learning? I considered phenomenology as the philosophy of live experiences independently be it constructive or destructive. The article presents the impressions of events as more perspective and multiple than learning of stories. Phenomenology pays attention to various cultural, social, and political experiences, including both narratives and events as well as memorials and live events. Contemporary propaganda tries to manufacture not only knowledge but also our emotions, intentions, and attitudes on both conceptual and behavioural levels. Advanced propaganda and PR are presented in the school’s curricula as well as formal and hidden education. Thoughtful phenomenological experiences of events depend on the level of subjectivity mobilisation of each person or the level of de-personalisation. The experience of the Other, and the alternative events of aliens presuppose de-subjection as the condition of acculturation, emic practices,

emotional involvement, empathy, and therefore understanding. In this sense, we interpret the process of de-subjection partly as a phenomenological reduction of psychological preferences, discursive stereotypes, and institutions of opinions. Interpretation of de-personalisation and related de-subjection as the version of phenomenological reduction could open the possibilities for us to understand the demands of the participation in the events of Others and even Aliens. The question of de-subjection presupposes analysis and critics of developing of subjectivity through educational, media processes and participation in the alternative events. On the contrary, the disclosure of the reduction brackets lets us understand the experience of subject building and the making of mobilisation propaganda.

Key words: reduction, subjection, de-subjection, discourse, event, alternative, mobilisation.

De-subjection as a form of phenomenological reduction

The idea of European Enlightenment was to build rational, responsible, strong, and state-oriented persons: the subjects of power. Such individuals could be operative mobilised to the battles for a better future, national pride, the memory of ancestors, and other myths or rational aims. Mobilisation and propaganda could be used in different moral, rational, religious, and political ways. The aim of propaganda is to build (German *Bildung*) corresponded subjectivity. So, the subject as a person we considered not only as an effect of the living world (or E. Husserl's *lebenswelt*), but first of all as an expression of *the will to power* (F. Nietzsche's *Wille zur Macht*) and mobilisational effect, as a political consequence of the will. However, it is necessary to emphasise that Husserl and Heidegger wrote mostly about transcendental subject considered as a "ground" of "the World as Will and Representation" (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*), paraphrasing A. Schopenhauer. However, both Husserl and Heidegger were much more dialectical in this case and emphasised inter-influences between *Lebenswelt* and subject as well as subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. For example, Heidegger interpreted subjectivity as the result of the world, and, vice versa, the world as a result of the experience of subject:

There is world only insofar as *Dasein* exists. But then is the world not something "subjective"? In fact it is! Only one may not at this point reintroduce a common, subjectivistic concept of "subject". (Heidegger, 1984).

I do not seek to present the development of neither Husserl's nor Heidegger's concept on the subjectivity and the oppositions between the two authors, nor do I intend to carry out a deep analysis of Heidegger's concept of subjectivity. E. Øverenget interpreted Heidegger's intention not to negate subjectivity, but [Heidegger] "introduces an interpretation according to which subjectivity is a Being-in-the-world that is not a thing" (Overenget, 1998, pp. 2). Heidegger did not analyse nor criticise Nazi or Soviet propaganda (Sheehan, 1979), nor America's cultural industries as a concrete expression of will to power or organised power for the production of controlled subjectivity. The problem is that the content and the inner structure of subjectivity is given not by the mythic world, but manufactured by particular institutions of persuasion, manufacturing of consent, and control of education. Propaganda's constructivism equally to mind engineering did not become the problem of Heidegger's research, and even he himself could be considered a victim of philosophical nativity in the face of Nazi propaganda. Jean-Paul Sartre and Theodor Adorno are much more interesting from this point of view: they fully understood the constructivist character of subjectivity and its needs to criticise the manufacturing of attitudes.

Failures of the France Revolution promoted the ideals of the Enlightenment engaged German philosophers to criticise the blindness of the mobilised spirit. The phenomenological analysis of the naïve Enlightened reason, for example D. Diderot's thoughts, was presented in G.G. Hegel's book "Phenomenology of spirit". He debated why the Enlightenment produced unhappy reason that is unable to change the internal intentions, but pretends to form the external behaviour of many people. According to Hegel, the Enlightenment and the France Revolution manifested the absolute law but lacked the spirit or Protestantism with internal human conscience and freedom. According to him, the world-historical aim or the aim of *Weltgeist* was to synthesise both. In "Philosophy of History" Hegel hoped that the synthesis of Protestantism and the Enlightenment should bring the advanced reason. After Hegel and young Hegelians, including Karl Marx as well as many writers and politicians, thought about how to influence the internal spiritual life of human beings or to realise the synthesis of internal conscience and external Enlightened laws. The solution was to develop propaganda, cultural industries, and education programmes.

Jean-Paul Sartre was more pessimistic as compared to Hegel, but much more realistic as compared to Heidegger. In phenomenological research on being of consciousness, he found the synthesis produces rather a self-delusion (*mauvaise foi*) than individual freedom. The problem of self-persuasion and fanaticism, the origin of totalitarianism from the desire

of self-delusion, formulates new problems for phenomenology. Sartre's discussed objective, principle self-delusion and the phenomenon of being-together-with-others in his works "Being and Nothingness" (Sartre, 1943) and "Existentialism is a humanism". The concept of the 20th century of the political or social person as a subject did not mean the absence of false consciousness and self-delusion. The intentions for servitude and fear of critics does not mean existential responsibility. From the other side, absolute negation of mobilisation discourses and related agitation could hide the importance of *La Résistance* against Nazi and the *Vichy regime* in the period of WWII. We need some dialectics of subjection and de-personalisation, which could be expressed through the contradiction between a discourse and an event and between a memory and an action.

The subjectivity is the concentration of *Zeitgeist* and *Landscape*, traditional and manufactured. More specifically, it is the recognition of identity, responsibility, and attitudes in a person. Philosophically, subjectivity is Heideggerian *Dasein*. Subjectivation is a highly physiological, communicative, and narrative action opposing the being as an event. Rather, subjectivation is an anti-event, limitation, and cutting of the multi-trendiness of the event. I interpret the concept of propaganda subjectivity in Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault senses. And there are the first problems: Husserl and Heidegger considered mostly the transcendental subject, whereas Althusser and Foucault analyse the discursive one. In this case, I partly support the position of Jurgen Habermas' on weak transcendental subjectivity that is formed or influenced by discursive practices or communicative actions. However, I think, that weak transcendental subjectivity is formed rather by events (*Ereignis*, according to Heidegger) than just discourses or narratives.

Husserl considered the subjectivity as an obstacle that should be reduced or bracketed in order to make phenomenological analysis of some intentions. In our case, we have an opposite situation: we need to take subjectivity into account and restrain (bracket) from other intentions. Many phenomenologists have opposed to the event of subjectivity as a narrative or discursive construct (Molbak, 2012) and I will continue this tradition. The core of subject as a person is some sort of narrative knowledge, memory, and structure. It is the issue of our delusion, or knowledge blindness. The more opinions we have, the less open we are to the event. One of the possibilities to trust the subjective self-delusion and subjugation is to open ourselves to the event as a centre of the being.

According to Habermas and many other contemporary philosophers, subjection is practically an inescapable process of contemporary society. I think differently: the de-subjection is the condition

of openness to the transcendent world, to the Otherness and Aliens, to the inter-subjectivity and experiencing of the event. However, society needs and cares about right education of subjectivity. I would add that the mobilisation and motivation, structuring and education of subjectivity are important for the development of political states, modernisation, and military defence processes. The growth of self-spectaclisation and egoism in the social network presupposes even more sophisticated forms of self-subjectification, and it creates problems for the civic society and the state. The creative, artistic, and critical processes as well as contemporary spiritual demands of the most active and intellectual human beings presupposes the radical analysis and criticism of any subjection. Discursive, ideological, legal, traditional, communaljections happen all the time in communicative actions. The example of directed and controlled actions is education in the state's school system. Pupils are involved into strong ideological subjection by the system of controlled education and governmental programmes. They act together with local communities and "social partners". Consumers are subject to marketing supply chain and discourses of the supply. Such dependencies are the product of institutional persuasion and discursive interpellation of individuals as subjects (as philosopher Althusser presupposed), construct lord-slave relationships and support oppressed consciousness. Liberation, in this case, means overcoming subjection or dependence as well as destruction of various forms of lord-serve relations. Emancipation is based on the dialectics of subjection and de-subjection, a discourse and event. Forceful persuasion through education, advertisement, and manipulation creates the need for de-subjection and free choosing of new identities even more. Nevertheless, the liberation of subjects from narrative dependencies could not be done only by developing different discursive alternatives. Alternative stories and discourses are too weak to break the subject as a person. The process of de-subjection means involvement and participation in the alternative events or the events with multitude of conclusions. The participating in feminist, LGBT, refugee, and Islamic representative events means much more than alternative stories presented in textbooks. Alternative-event oriented education presupposes fewer classes and more meetings, but this way helps us to deconstruct strong subjectivities.

There are a few problems of de-subjection. Firstly, in order to organise de-subjection, we need the presence of subjection. It corresponds to the basic idea of proletarian liberation through education. In many cases it means simply learning how to read, write, calculate, as well as some scientific knowledge about the world. Only after it, the critique of subjectivity becomes possible. Secondly, is critique of one-

dimensional studies. Studies are learning of hegemonic stories and presenting of strong alternatives. However, as I said before, the learning and studying of alternatives in the classroom looks less influential than participating in different events and building alternative experiences. Propaganda, social engineering, and related education try to manage and direct the process of subjection in aggregate democracies as well as totalitarian or religious fundamentalism states. Their textbooks present mostly the only story, one system of values, interpretation of events or typology of heroes and enemies. Unfortunately, many Lithuanian, Polish or Russian textbooks on history, literature, geography, civic education, ethics, religion, and art either do not have strong narrative alternatives or have few rather weak alternatives for discussion. They prefer the principle of telling of one truth without oppositions. The truth in schools is seen as the most important goal despite the fact that the truth is just our interpretation of literature, political sciences, civic education, history, religious studies, and so on. After Nietzsche and Foucault is ridiculous to speak about objective truth in social sciences and humanities, but about tendencies, powers and influences. In many humanities' and social sciences' cases the truth is the only ideological construction. The clarity of textbook stories is the most dangerous phenomenon and critical approach. Public discussions, a system of counter presentations and obligatory discussions could help to escape from indoctrination. However, it is not enough do deconstruct subjectivity.

Propaganda uses music or other emotional and visual materials in order to enrich the content of ideas and concepts and make strong intentions. Propaganda simulates the elements of event and becomes more than just storytelling. How can we oppose such event imitation attempts? There are a few possibilities. The weakest is to present narrative alternatives. This is good for the formal classes, but always gets lost under pressing of music, films and activism per the hidden curriculum. The other solution is to follow the example of advanced propaganda and to present alternatives in the context of critique of music as well as video and audio materials. Nevertheless, propaganda that stages the events through directing memorial meetings, demonstrations, and fake manifestations looks stronger. The resistance to coercive advanced propaganda is the students' involvement into the events with multiplicity of perspectives opposed to the only horizon of narrative. Alternative events mean not only the visiting of memorial places and meetings, but also participation in the emotional drama and the clashes of opinions. For example, the events of the first independence of the Republic of Lithuania in 1918 in Lithuanian textbooks are presented mostly as ethnic political history. The role of Jews,

Belarusians, Germans, and Poles is described not as possible alternatives of state but as some wrong historical trajectories. So pupils and students cannot understand what happened with common Lithuanian-Belarusian nation and the State or with developed Yiddish literature or with very old culture of manors of Polish speaking nobility largely existed in Lithuania before 1918 and some elements until 1940. The learning of the event building presupposes emotional, differently-oriented meetings with the people of a national pride - with Polish, Belarusian or Jew representatives of Lithuania's living world in their *Zeitgeist* and cultural landscape. In this case, the paradigm of strong alternatives could be transformed into multiplicity of events. It helps to open possibilities for deconstruction of narrative persons. So, the learning and consideration of alternatives as well as the development of scepticism or criticism is not a sufficient condition of resistance to the massive propaganda through textbooks. Contemporary phenomenologists and post-structural philosophers, for example, Alain Badiou (2006), say that events can make an even stronger impression. However, simulacrum events and the production of simulacrum reality that was described in the books of Jean Boudrillard and implemented in the contemporary manufacturing of opinion, do very similarly. So, I am talking not just about post-critical participation in the experience of events, but about participating in the alternative reality events and the comparative analysis of different experiences.

Critique of critical pedagogy and open education paradigms

Paolo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1972), *Critical Pedagogy* by Peter McLaren (2006), Ira Shor (1992), Ivan Illich (1970), *Critique of Social Education* by Jean-Claude Passeron and Pierre Bourdieu (1977), and their followers discussed the liberation of peoples from coercive and hidden manipulation and mobilisation. As I mentioned before, the aim is not to fully reject mobilisational actions. They are needed in the civic life not only for authoritarian or totalitarian needs, but for the resistance from such disasters as global warming, terrorism, etc. Besides, contemporary propaganda uses the critics' skills for the counter-propaganda action, and the idea of the pedagogy of the oppressed could be used for the mobilisation of masses in order to build dictatorships and provide terror.

Critical pedagogy textbooks serve the development of deliberative democracy, the making of communicative alternatives, and the skills to choose the best existential world. On the other hand, critical pedagogy follows believes in a good society, truth, the victory of conscience, the

possibility of understanding, the making of rational agreements as some higher values. This is the problem related to the errors of the Enlightenment. The diversity of alternatives cannot be fully intelligible due to the importance of language and epistemological differences. So the learning of “obscurity”, radical differences, or transgressions is important for the future emic, acculturation, participatory researches, diplomacy and negotiations as well as the experience of alternative events.

Critical pedagogy presented in the works of Paulo Freire (1972) and Raymond Williams develops the skills of self-advocacy and critical choices not only in the oppressed and non-educated societies (Freire), but also in the contemporary states (Williams). Critical pedagogy is spread between leftists of Latin America, Brazil, and Mexico and has an aim to empower local people to solve self-government and fight for equal contracts and dignity. According to Williams, critical pedagogy in Great Britain has the same tasks: to provide individuals and groups with skilled self-advocacy and self-government. Critical pedagogy is a very important form some time when simple education and advocacy of the family, women and trade union rights are urgent problem. But where and when are the actions of critical pedagogy successful and when does critical pedagogy fail? The failure of critical pedagogy is greatly influenced by the victories of socialist and national collectivism, the idea of the working class or nation dictatorship as well as the interpretation of the working class as being homogenous or one-dimensional, blind criticism of everything that does not correspond to the needs of one-dimensional working class or nation. The failures could be explained by the absence of good theories and practices of de-subjection, multiplicity, autonomism, alternative groups and their conflicts, and competition as something positive.

The situation of open education is even worse. It enables informal, free and long-distance or online, non-systematic learning. Open access makes learning independent, based on self-motivation and presupposes the competition of the many distance-learning platforms (Bosworth, 1991). In this case, the content of subjectivity and related experiences is completed by personal choice, community demands for knowledge, and commercial practices without special state control. However, it does not mean the growth of smart scepticism or scientific criticism, nor the making of strong alternatives, such as narratives or events. People can be equally involved into religious fanaticism, Nazism, racism, irrational hatred towards females or traditional prejudices be it by individual choice or small independent communities. It has not happened mostly because hegemony of the market of images and fashion of some sort of knowledge. It fully

depends on the market and group interests. So, open education is important but not a sufficient issue of resistance to the propaganda manipulation. This is one of the reasons for the State to control or forbid the cases of open education.

Open education seeks to eliminate all barriers of entry into the online learning system, and for this purpose it uses various platforms or financing. The growth of open education stimulates digital marketing, but it also encourages pirating, the sharing of materials, high competition, and the growth of teacher competences. Open education uses digital textbooks, open resources and curricula, such as Wikiversity, Curriki, as well as provides independent cinema, documentary, subcultural or literature. Open education does not have a system and only partly helps to provide narrative alternatives and related deliberative democracy. Many social network groups online have at least some elements of open self-education. Open education through social networking coincides with public communicative actions. Some participants of the open education groups through new media could be activists of the marginal groups and movements and be involved into alternative realities, for example, in the learning of “hacktivism”, pirating, or anonymous movement discussions. But it is accidental rather than normal practice. Online openness does not have an obligation nor orientation to involve people into social, political, and cultural practices of alternatives and does not make propaganda less influential. Moreover, open education does not mean participation in alternative events and does not care about long-term emotional condition and body consciousness. Therefore, open education is hardly involved into significant experiencing of events and is a weak alternative to propaganda pressing. Besides, open education does not help service learning, which is much more open to participatory event education.

The smart and limited process of liberation from the State propaganda is much more sophisticated than from direct agitation of political parties, corporative advertisement, or religious rituals. Classical critical pedagogy and open education systems as well as lifelong learning practices are neither effective nor oriented to resist against advanced propaganda. Systems of schools, colleges, and universities are mostly part of the State organisation and serve for the people. Public radio, television, and other media can support public interests and critical reason as well as the corporative interest and the State ideology. The freedom of speech and the system of free elections does not guarantee absence of broad manipulations. This is why not only public criticism, but also public actions and alternative events are equally important. Our thesis is communicative practices, social critique and telling of alternative stories.

Open education is important but it does not provide sufficient conditions for the development of smart resistance to mobilisational propaganda.

The critique of false education and suggested alternatives

False education is part of the system of false consciousness, which was described in the works of Denise Meyerson (1991) and Christopher L. Pines (1993). Pines notices:

Basically, out of ignorance, education, habit and other social factors, social agents tend to “idealize” the dominant assumptions, ideas and categories characteristic of their socially historical cultures and social groups, thereby attributing to their socially relative beliefs the status of being absolutely valid and rational *a priori*. (1993, pp. 40)

The system of education under ideological control has features of *false education* in some cases (history, literature, civic education, etc.) and produces oppressed intellect. I separate intellect (*Verstand*) and reason (*Vernunft*) in the Kantian and Hegelian manner. Intellect is responsible for adequate judgment and interpretation, and reason transcends our knowledge, helps us gain new ideals, values, aims. Propaganda tries to replace the higher absolute Reason. Pupils and adults are educated to have good intellect and make correct conclusions, based on propaganda’s as the Reason propositions. The new propaganda education tries to form not only the pupils’ intellect but also their body-consciousness, world-experiences. It follows the demands of the higher Reason: Church, Party, the Father of Nations... It does not mean that schools produce totalitarian or authoritarian bodies, but the persons oriented to consume the State’s ideology and big corporations’ production, values, aims of life, and forms of communication. One-dimensional education calls itself a systemic and corresponding and it supports alienated, ideologically substituted consciousness as well as creates the system of false education (Kann, 1981).

Traditional ideological or religious *false consciousness* is the system and feelings of oppressed intellect. One of the modus of an oppressed mind is *simulacrum consciousness* in the time of contemporaries depicted in *The Society of the Spectacle* (Debord, 1983) and simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1994). The machines of opinions produce different desires and one of the bigger of them is a desire of self-spectaclisation through the consumption or imitation of simulacrum. The elements of self-spectaclisation are involved into education through the new media, social networks, and the need of self-advertising, leadership, and competition to

be the first among the simulacrum leaders. *False or simulacrum education* means learning the needs of the State or political parties' ideology, corporate-oriented branding, or old fashioned church rituals. As in the case of propaganda we do not need to evaluate simulacra and simulations only negatively. They are one of the most important elements of the Western world's progress, and many creative industries as well as good societies depend on the consumption of creative packing and brands. Employing creativity via smartphones or presenting new visions of Disney Parks has been the key success factor for millions of people. Contemporary propaganda uses the simulations of reality as an important new issue of mass persuasion. We need to learn to separate realities and the Real. Realities are visible and thinkable manifestations of the Real, and they can be simulated and imitated. The Real can be considered either as mythological or propaganda's Promise about the Golden Past or Happy Future or as a social and cultural Transcendence. The transcendent Real is always more than could possibly be presented or manifested. The Real is not a sum of realities. Propaganda always tries to falsify the higher Reason and the Real prevails maintaining : they cannot be controlled by any other group but by divine Church or the Leader.

The new media system disturbs or helps simulacrum and the leaders of political movements to simulate mainstream ideology, cultural hegemony, the topics of discussion and audiences to control the reproduction of a homogenous society. New media create possibilities for organising or critiquing the centres for control of interpretations in educational processes. For example, new communicational technologies are used to evaluate the state exams at gymnasiums, the system of entrance into colleges and universities, the registration and validation of programmes in universities, while producing public examples of understanding history, literature, culture. The activities of new media need more and more creative industries that could help to produce events rather than information. On the opposite side, there are many social and economic events. However, they are less interesting to creative industries because they produce alternative events and do not coincide with broadcasting interests. This is why the concept of alternative social realities and education, for example, per service learning, social practices, participatory learning of social conflicts could become alternative gates to the Real, differently from the products produced by creative industries.

The opposition between hidden curriculum in new media and formal education in schools is rather wrong, because they are state, Church and corporative capital oriented. Learning to interpret the image market in the "right" corporative way and the state control of educational processes

coincides with the phenomenon of neoliberalism, which is a conjunction of the State's bureaucracy and its corporative interests. Meanwhile, internet social networks continue to be the public places and assist in communication among various social groups – subcultural and religious groups, lifestyle societies, new political movements as well as those of various national movements. Many of them organise alternative discourses, symbolic systems, events and new realities. Open con-divisional products, like Wikipedia or anarchistic free universities, conflict with official ideology or hegemonic culture and support self-organised chaos of dynamic identities and invite people into alternative events. So, social media and the Internet are completely ambiguous. On the one hand, they follow the neoliberal rules, control informational mechanisms and related textbooks in order to build a “one-dimensional society” (Marcuse, 1992); on the other hand, the same new media stimulate heterogeneous groups, a flux of identities and competing alternative world feelings. The ambiguity of the new horizon of life is the condition for de-subjection, a preparation to participate in the alternative events, and to develop multiple body consciousness.

Why is propaganda and its supplements necessary for democratic state?

Sartre noticed that human thinking has a tendency for totalising judgments and forming self-delusion. In many cases the deliveries of false consciousness could be criticised in order to correspond to real processes or a concrete (Sartre, 1976). He considered critical dialectics as a philosophy of achievement of the Real and its existential experiences. Sartre tried to find common points between existential phenomenology and dialectical critique of the society. Existential phenomenology has to show the priority of existence on essence, and critical dialectics has to negate the situation of self-delusion. On the contrary, propaganda acts completely in the opposite direction and tries to negate the Real in order to support mass self-delusions: desires, myths, mobilisational stories, etc. However, we changed the understanding of the Real as the only possible concept and are speaking about multiplicity of the Real's manifestations or events. In many cases, propaganda is not a lie, but the only interested form of representation of the manifestation. Additionally, the creative persuading could be scene, to simulate the manifestation of the Real, to film, to involve people, to represent it in the State and corporations' “right” way.

Edward Bernays, a famous American propagandist of the 20th century, and many of his contemporary followers, emphasised that democratic propaganda is based on engineering of consent (Bernays, 1928) through not only the State, but also private corporative media, that produces desires and pop cultural images. They express social needs for modernisation, and demonstrate the possibilities to get bigger profit and manipulate a social. According to Bernays, large masses and spontaneous crowds cannot elaborate consent on many social and cultural ‘phenomena or event because don’t have necessary skills, critical elective attention, no means or forms for independent self-education and analysis. According to him, the weakness of mass and crowd consciousness lies in irrational seeking, lack of critical judgments, and impossibility to achieve a consent. It is the reason for using direct propaganda and public relations. So, the consent of mass society is production of media and elites. Philosopher and psychoanalytic Wilhelm Reich noticed that masses and crowds suppress spontaneous destructive desires and the collective body’s impulses, therefore they seek euphoria and pleasures instead of critical and enlightened judgements, and prefer satisfaction of group imagery as well as mythic arguments rather than self-educational activities. (Reich, 1970). Partly similar considerations were developed by Walter Lippmann (1922) and Karl Popper. Popper separated total or utopian and piecemeal social engineering:

From what I have said about the attitude of the social engineer, it must not be inferred that there are no important differences within the camp of the social engineers. On the contrary, the difference between what I call ‘piecemeal social engineering’ and ‘Utopian social engineering’ is one of the main themes of this book. (1962, pp. 30).

Popper proposed that limited social engineering builds an open society as sufficient reasonable and acceptable unit, and his thoughts were similar to those of Bernays. Social engineering presupposes not only the development of propaganda or narratives, but also as new experiences and practices, new disciplines and regimes. The Soviet Gulag system was a totalitarian social engineering project. However, could Kremlin’s intellectuals control the processes of experiencing events everywhere, for example in the Gulag? Very often the Gulag concentration and labour camp system became autonomous and appeared as a new reality, completely different from Soviet propaganda narratives. Moreover, the Gulag system was destroying the propaganda attempts and, as a consequence, millions lost the faith in Communism. So, social engineering could be the opposite of what the propaganda claims. The social facts

testify the difference between existential processes and propaganda narratives.

Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky noticed (1988) that communicational engineering for democracy serves not for the dynamic communities and flexible individuals but for corporations' and ideological apparatus'. This remark concerns educational processes which are regulated by the State in order to satisfy the demands of bureaucracy and the needs of the biggest corporations, but not for self-organising purposes of a competitive, divorce society, not for creative self-expression of flexible individuals.

The limits of aggregative democracy and the phenomenon of over-Real

The model of aggregative democracy was described in Joseph Schumpeter's book *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* in 1942 (updated in 1947) and corresponded with the needs of democracy in post-war Europe (Schumpeter, 1975). Probably the same aggregative system is important for new democracies in Arabic countries of Central-Eastern Asia or Africa, where the system of democratic procedures and balance of power as well as the development of parties experience challenges. Philosopher Chantal Mouffe criticised aggregative democracy. According to her, aggregative democracy is based on the fulfilment of functions of the branches that are separate from the State power and the activities of political parties: the right to vote, elections, the freedom of political parties, and the knowledge of power structure. The system of aggregating through political parties alienates many individuals from direct participation in self-governing. Aggregative democracy negates individual political activity, conflicts, and a need for hot debates. Mouffe wrote: "In a pluralist democracy such disagreements are not only legitimate but also necessary" (Mouffe, 1999, pp. 552). Predictable aggregative democracy and the State apparatus defend the interests of local bureaucracy, party nomenclature, the power of corporations, and hidden monopolies. For the purposes of loyalty, the democratic state needs instruments for training its citizens or subjects of power. Direct engineering of mass-consciousness through education, mass media, and entertainment or cultural industries is important. The learning of democracy becomes the study of functions and tasks of the apparatus, but not the study of open processes of multiplicity nor participation in the development of alternatives.

Aggregative democracy supports the system of unified and standardised exams and tests, unanimous and centralised system of

educational programmes, one type of intentions and corresponding narratives in textbooks. Related educational industry produces subjectivity that is loyal to the power and systems of control, including Copy Right, as well as standardised knowledge and exams. Aggregative democracy has no interest in developing smart scepticism, de-subjection, or alternative experiences with an alternative body-consciousness development. Aggregative democracy tries to build a stable society with predictable social identities and roles. Philosophers John Rawls (1993), Habermass (1995), and Mouffe (2000) criticised aggregative democracy, which is mostly involved into formal managing of society for the supporting and directing voting procedures.

Deliberative and even competing (agonal) democracy is more important in the developed communicative and heterogeneous countries with long-time practices and traditions of democratic elections, advocacy of social interest, and political party competition. Deliberation presupposes dialogue, diplomacy, and agreements between oppositions and the changing of periphery – centre powers. The example of contemporary Russia and the system of the “vertical of power” and using of new media for mass propaganda shows that contemporary communicative technologies and the Internet can equally serve authoritarian regimes or deliberative democracy. Rawls and Habermas thought that deliberative democracy could benefit the reproduction of equal rights, rational communication, and moral institutions of society. Deliberative democracy is based on providing and searching of consent or civic agreement and can overcome limits of aggregative democracy and propaganda tendencies. The problem is that deliberative democracy and rational communication are not oriented to produce more conflicts and alternatives; they do not seek to create conflicts and build alienated realities. Alienation is considered to be wrong, and unification is thought to be the democratic achievement, which is a prejudice of political and religious mythology. Many marginal political movements, small newspapers, subcultures, anarchist movements, religious sects, and creative individuals conflict with the myth of unification and mobilisation. Mouffe remarks:

Indeed, the situation in the international arena is today in many respects similar to the one found in domestic politics, with its lack of an agonistic debate about possible alternatives (Mouffe, 1999).

Agonistic debates about possible alternatives is a communicative solution to the limits of aggregative democracy. However, agonal and disputing deliberative democracy is not oriented towards the diversity of alternative realities that is not ready for direct negotiation. The multiplicity of alienated and agonistic realities produces the phenomenon of the over-

Real. The prefix “over” shows the transcendence character of the Real, it is more than a simple sum of manifestations or realities. Participation in the alienated realities and acceptance of them opens the court on the over-Real or transcendence.

From the end of the 18th century until the middle of the 20th century, classical masses and crowds needed a charismatic leader and forceful persuasion to organise and direct them. Significant events could not happen without the voice and figure of the leader. On the contrary, contemporary consumer-crowds, spectacle-masses can act independently on social networks without any significant leader. Is multi-leadership the cause for it or do masses have a higher level of standard education in the 21st century? Contemporary consumer societies use the Internet and social networks and have the possibility to speak and hear each other in the horizon of advertisements, popular slogans, brands, and entertainment. The representatives of the Internet crowds think that they are significant because they are together with wide-spread advertising and brands. The changes in living world (*Lebensvelt* in Husserlian sense) and communicative systems are the basis for the transformation of mass consciousness and the traditional role of the leaders. The heroic leadership was changed by role playing or simulacrum leadership. These changes help propaganda because PR institutions can present newly constructed leaders fit for consumer needs. There is no more boring same-person leadership, but new leaders emerge every day oriented towards the mass desire. Is simulacrum leadership a result of de-subjection? I think it is completely the opposite. Simulacrum leadership does not presuppose neither deep criticism nor participation in the alternative reality events. Simulacrum leaders are the product of new media and creative industries and do not accumulate participatory skills nor social knowledge. They limit themselves by corporative responsibility, role playing, and correspondence of the desires of the audience. However, participating in the alternative realities and accumulation of experiences and multiple orientations is based on self-responsibility and growth of participatory skills and competence as well as the skills of de-subjection.

The development of individualism versus collectivism was considered as anti-propaganda issue in Western societies. I think it is wrong judgement. Could the same statement be applied to contemporary highly-alienated and atomistic society? The powerful discourses: good society and liberty, freedoms and obligations manage individuals independently of their participation in social groups. They do it even more successfully if the individuals are alienated. So they become the victims of TV and Internet broadcasting and turn into aggressive supporters of propaganda,

kitchen-generals or the members of sofa-army. The growth of simulacrum individualism in the second half of the 20th century coincides with the spreading of consumer masses and new forms of manipulation through entertainment and advertisement. Simulacrum individualism imitates an independent person and expresses itself through the demands of uncontrolled consumption of goods without participating in the event. Simulacrum individualism is an aggressive spectator of TV News who never participates in the street clashes or barricades of the warfare battle. A simulacrum individual does not need to develop their body consciousness and they cannot separate the consumption of representations from the manifestation of the event.

Conclusions

The de-subjection or reduction of subjectivities is an important issue of contemporary phenomenology and attempts to explain inter-subjectivity of intentions, con-dividualism of communicative reason, body-consciousness, and being, based on the diversity of events. Critical pedagogy and open education are mostly oriented towards resisting elementary oppression, advocating the needs of the working class, or supporting online and lifelong learning and making independent curriculum. However, they lack the skills to develop agonistic alternative discourses and related de-subjectivation. Contemporary states use propaganda, education, and controlled communication as instruments of limited social engineering. Social engineering as well as aggregative or formal democracy needs propaganda not only for mass mobilisation, industrialisation, and security, but also for the manipulation of satisfaction of bureaucracy class and comital corporations needs and profit. The idea and principles of deliberative democracy supports the idea of alternative discourses, identities, conflicts, and a need for negotiations. Deliberative democracy solved many problems of aggregative democracy and mobilisational propaganda. However, contemporary PR and advanced propaganda technologies are capable of producing even more alternative discourses, images, simulacrum realities, and staged leadership.

Contemporary alienated people try to develop street collaboration and create the diversity of events as well as alternative events through social-media platforms and through the development of multiplicity of body-consciousness that is needed for the participation in alternative actions. Alternative actions continuously happen in the street protests and riots in Western societies. We cannot exclude social media and Internet communication as a means of making the significant event, but we can

understand the influences of the events on the forming of body consciousness and subjectivity. In addition, the event-oriented practices and consciousness can separate simulacrum leaders and the members of sofa-armies from participatory responsibility. There are many problems between those who left computer screen “reality” and went into street direct action. Many of them do not necessarily have communal, participatory skills and attitudes to be involved into conflicts and social-cultural processes. So, they are still in the field of propaganda, as well as manipulation and use false consciousness, support false communication notwithstanding of deliberative democracy and open learning. The problem for them is to separate themselves from propaganda unity and simulacrum individuality and to become critical con-dividuals of the diverse events. The event oriented de-subjection, con-dividualism, and multiplicity are the response to the alienated individuals, corporate propaganda, and controlled state education. It is possible after phenomenologically grounded procedure of de-subjection: smart scepticism, scientific and humanities criticism, creating alternatives, participating in the alternative events, and building multiple body-consciousness.

References

- Badiou, A. (2006). *Being and Event*. London: Continuum.
- Baudrillard, J. (1994). *Simulacra and simulation*. Michigan: The University of Michigan
- Bernays, E. (1928). *Propaganda*. New York: Horace Liveright.
- Bosworth, D. P. (1991). *Open Learning*. London: Cassell.
- Bourdieu, P., Passeron J.C. (1977). *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. London: Sage.
- Debord, G. (1983). *Society of the Spectacle*. London: Rebel Press.
- Rowntree, D. (1993). *Teach yourself with open learning*. London: Routledge.
- Freire, P. (1972). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. New York, Herder & Herder.
- Habermas, J. (1995). Reconciliation through the public use of reason. Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 92 (3), 109-131.
- Heidegger, M. (1984). *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. Indiana University Press.
- Herman, E. S. & Chomsky, N. (1988). *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon.
- Illich, I. (1970). *Deschooling Society*. New York: Marion Boyars.
- Kann, M. E. (1981). Political Education and Equality: Gramsci Against "False Consciousness", *Teaching Political Science*, 8 (4), 417-446.
- Lippmann, W. (1922). *Public opinion*. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co.

- Marcuse, H. (1992). *One-dimensional man— studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society*. London: Routledge.
- McLaren, P. (2006). *Rage and Hope: Interviews with Peter McLaren on War, Imperialism and Critical Pedagogy*. New York, Peter Lang Publishers.
- Meyerson, D. (1991). *False Consciousness*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Molbak, R. L. (2012). From a Phenomenology of the Subject to a Phenomenology of the Event: Reconstructing the Ontological Basis for a Phenomenological Psychology, *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology*, 43, 185–215.
- Mouffe, Ch. (1999). Democracy in a Multipolar World, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 37 (3), 549–561.
- Mouffe, Ch. (2000). *Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism*. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Overenget, E. (1998). *Seeing the Self. Heidegger on subjectivity*. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer academic publishers.
- Pines, Ch. L. (1993). *Ideology and false consciousness. Marx and his historical progenitors*. New York: State University of New York.
- Popper, K. (1962). *Open society and its enemies*. London : Routledge & K. Paul.
- Reich, W. (1970). *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Rawls, J. (1993). *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sartre, J.-P. (1943). *L'Être et le néant : Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique*, Paris: Gallimard.
- . (1976). *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. Vol. I. London: NLB.
- Sheehan, T. (1979). Heidegger Controversy Philosophy and Propaganda: Response to Professor Bronner, *Salmagundi*, 43, 173-184.
- Shor, I. (1992). *Empowering Education: Critical Teaching for Social Change*. London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schumpeter, J. A. (1975). *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Thoburn, N. (2003). *Deleuze, Marx and Politics*. London, Routledge.

CHAPTER TWO

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND ART: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

DR. GIEDRE STRAKSIENE

KLAIPEDA UNIVERSITY, LITHUANIA

DR. ALEKSANDRA BATUCHINA

KLAIPEDA UNIVERSITY, LITHUANIA

ASSOC. PROF. ODED BEN HORIN

WESTERN NORWAY UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES,
NORWAY

Abstract: Nowadays interest in communication between practitioners of science and of art is on the rise. The nature of these issues also emphasize the importance of communication between science and art as a part in the educational process. This IPA phenomenological study aims to explore communication between scientists and artists. We approach this by analyzing communication interaction between the two groups in the context of cross-disciplinary educational environments in which art and science are explored simultaneously. The main question of the research is concerned with an analysis of what constitutes the communication between science and art practitioners within educational context? The study is based on nine interviewees with scientists and artists, who experienced the Write a Science Opera method in Norway in 2015. The findings of this study suggested that the effective dialogue between scientists and artists is central to successful realization of cross-disciplinary art and science projects. The results of this study also provides a base for mutual education and communication, a conceptual understanding about other disciplines, and steps towards the facilitation of the integration of disciplines.

Key words: art, science, communication, dialogue, scientists, artists

Introduction

We live in a time of extensive interaction between disciplines, where communication plays a leading role. Moreover, art has become one of the dominant mediums (as a form of communication) for conveying science to the public/audience. How, then, is communication between art and science practitioners experienced?

When approaching the characterization of art and science communication, it is worth mentioning that art and science share many things in common. As Rorie (2010) emphasizes, it is ironic that art and science differ most noticeably in the great trait they have in common: communication. To this end, the question is what separates art and science communication forms from each other?

Rorie (2010) claims while both art and science depend on successful communication, but that they differ in the direction in which they are communicating, as follows: science begins with the physical, observable, the concrete occurrences in the world, and scientists generate abstractions that communicate their understanding of those phenomena. Artist begins with their abstract, often subjective perceptions, beliefs or feelings, and thereafter generate something specific and concrete based on those abstractions. Science creates new paradigms of thought and it is the process of creating an objective understanding of the world.

Bubaš (2014) comments that art is communication intrinsically. A work of art can include all manner of subjective information, either formally through manipulation by drama/theatre, music, choreography, literature or other forms or elements of art. A substantial difference between science and art exists with regard to their communication forms: a piece of scientific information, which can be perceived as an objective series of words, and a piece of literature, which can use all manner of methods to add additional meaning to the words. The challenge here is that sometimes perceiver (reader/listener/viewer) interprets (decodes) information in a different way than was originally intended.

As a result, the arts and sciences have the potential to develop new approaches and dialogue by being implemented together in cross-disciplinary educational settings (e.g. Ben Horin, 2016) (Straksiene, Batuchina, Ben Horin, 2017). If successful in meeting this challenge more systematically than is the case today, innovators in these fields will be able to develop new, inter-disciplinary teaching forms.

The current research is based on the European Commission's Comenius project "Implementing Creative Strategies into Science Teaching (CREAT-IT)". One of the case studies explored and evaluated

within that project was Write a Science Opera (WASO), a cross-disciplinary art and science education approach developed at Stord/Haugesund University College, Norway. Our reason for choosing the WASO approach for this study is due to WASO's involving artists and scientists in collaborative work towards looking for new, innovative educational approaches and methods. WASO, as a meeting point of artists and scientists, also provides all stakeholders with an embodied and emotional understanding of the common impulses of science and art (Garoyan & Mathews, 1996). We perceive, therefore, that there is potential in providing evidence-based knowledge regarding communication across these disciplines as it occurs within that gap.

The authors explored how scientists and artists communicate within the cross-disciplinary educational context. In addition, we sought to interpret interviewees' experiences, and the events, people, and situations that impacted communication. Therefore, investigating the phenomenon of communication during this study required the artists and scientists to be continuously aware of their reasoning, their learning, and their communication.

We wanted to emphasize the character of communication between scientists and artists in educational settings. The question of this research is therefore formulated as follows: *What characterizes the communication between science and art professionals in an educational context?* This question contains multiple embedded and overlapping phenomena, which required explicit attention in order to understand and interpret the main research phenomenon as a whole. Therefore, we investigated the following research sub-questions: What character of communicational relationships occur during collaborations of arts and science professionals? And how do artists and scientists understand and perform communication in science education of a cross-disciplinary, arts-infused nature: what do scientists have to say about communicational practices in the arts, and vice versa?

Theoretical background

The communication process is a coordinating action, as Habermas (1984) emphasizes, in which actors in society seek to reach common understanding and coordinate actions by reasoned argument, consensus, and cooperation rather than strategic action strictly in pursuit of their own goals (Habermas, 1984). Additionally, in the educational context this process brings one's influence to bear on creative training, in which art and science come together to collaborate with the aim of integration of the "knowing and doing" elements, and in which both involved parties may

contribute through effective dialogue.

Moreover, the communication process has a number of components, but it is believed that it is mostly expressed by language, and as a result in the communication process - a sender sends a fixed meaning to a hearer via the linguistic expression associated with that meaning (Strakšiene, Batuchina, Ben-Horin, 2017). Thus, language, expressed in verbal and nonverbal forms, creates the meaning, which gives the option to be understood or misunderstood. As Bakhtin highlights:

The terminological imprecision and confusion in this methodologically central point of linguistic thinking result from ignoring the real unit of speech communication: the utterance. For speech can exist in reality only in the form of concrete utterances of individual speaking people, speech subjects. Speech is always cast in the form of an utterance belonging to a particular speaking subject, and outside this form it cannot exist (1979, pp. 71).

As a result, it would seem that communication is impossible without language and vice versa.

Bakhtin (1979, pp. 75) has said, “[Dialogue] is the simplest and the most classic form of speech communication”. The change of speaking subjects (speakers) that determines the boundaries of the utterance is especially clear here. But in other spheres of speech communication as well, including areas of complexly organized cultural communication (scientific and artistic), the nature of the boundaries of the utterance remains the same. In Bakhtin’s approach to dialogue, the utterance interacts with several things simultaneously. Each utterance interacts with the speaker’s past related traditions, while at the same time considering the listener’s understanding, stance, etc. The possibility of the listener’s understanding that utterance, however, requires that the people conversing share a context (Akhutina, 2003).

However, language is not the only way to communicate, especially when we are discussing potential meeting points of art and science. An artist uses a variety of tools such as sounds, visual images, signs/symbols, movements, melodies and so on to communicate the particular message the creator wants to invoke. It must be said that the scientist’s communication with audiences mostly consists of the spoken word, visual signs such as figures, tables, photos, maps and other conceptual diagrams. In addition, we can draw a parallel between the scientific information and the relation of art, and/or finding new dimensions of reality and new ways of creation of reality inherent to artistic manner. Bubaš says:

Reality is constructed in language, but language cannot describe reality. Can it be done by art? While science is based on the assumption, art is based on the possibility. In that context the collaboration between an artist and a scientist is potentially fruitful, provided that they are equal. *If science becomes a teacher of art, and if a hierarchical relation is established, there can be no dialogue*, and art becomes merely an artistic translation of scientific assumptions (2014, pp. 188).

Bubaš quotes Heisenberg, who says:

Art and science are cognitive tools which participate in the creation of reality, and therefore they have a large responsibility. The problem of the rationalist system is the tendency to separate and categorize, which impairs communication among different activities. The problem of language is also an aggravating circumstance, as is the question of methodology. In an ideal situation neither art nor science should be on their separate pedestals, communicating only occasionally (2014, pp.188).

Taking Akhutina's (2003) words into account deepens this perspective: Envisioning the scientific story, a scientist can lead to comprehensive research programs. Combining visual elements can lead to new insights, as can the comparing of different datasets or approaches. Learning how to communicate science is probably as important a skill as learning how to do science. It is one thing to learn how to collect and analyze data - it's a whole other thing to learn how to effectively communicate science (Akhutina, 2003).

In realizing the inter-disciplinary art and science education, we are providing the context for individuals of different disciplines (science and art) to *converse*. The major reason is, according to M. Bakhtin (1979, pp. 75), "complexly structured and specialized works of various scientific and artistic genres, in spite of all the ways in which they differ from rejoinders in dialogue, are by nature the same kind of speech communication". At the same time, the individuals from these differing domains are each interacting with their own past traditions. Indeed, M. Bakhtin wrote, text lives only by making contact with another text (context) which in turn creates interaction between personalities.

Finally, communication between persons engaging in the arts and sciences should offer the needed skills towards developing clear messages, including the ability to communicate verbally, solve problems, think critically, obtain and process information and analyze data in such a way that terminologies and approaches within both art and science are understood on both sides of the disciplinary borders. We believe this to be

the case because, as our data will show below, the role of communication is central to the successful integration of fields in cross-disciplinary work. To be clear, we do not wish to overly conflate science and art or to argue that artistic and scientific processes can be substituted for one another. Rather, we seek to note similarities between these two fields that have deep histories of shared understandings (Rorie, 2015), and involve understandings that to our minds, often have more in common than they have differences.

Research methodology

The research design is based on a qualitative strategy. The research question contains multiple embedded and overlapping phenomena, which required explicit attention in order to understand and interpret the main research phenomenon as a whole. It therefore resonates well within the strategies and intentions of the phenomenological research paradigm.

A phenomenological approach was chosen as a suitable methodology for this study. In general, phenomenology is concerned with lived experience, and is thus ideal for investigating personal experiences (van Manen, 2014), and it is based on the philosophical works of Husserl, Heidegger and others (Creswell, 2007). The phenomenological approach seeks to reveal the essence of the phenomenon, as M. van Manen (2014) emphasized. In M. Van Manen's (2014) understanding, it is possible to make the description and analysis of the phenomenon of experienced human feelings (e.g. lived experience). As a result, the phenomenological approach requires the researcher to be in a constant state of wonder (van Manen, 2014). From this perspective, the world must never be taken for granted (van Manen, 2014) and every moment of life, and every lived experience, is unique and distinctive.

Phenomenology has many branches and deviations, one of which is Interpretative Phenomenology Analysis (IPA), presented by J. A. Smith. IPA, as a research approach, helps look deeper into the phenomenon suitable for this research – namely, the phenomenon of dialogue between science and art. Communication is impossible without language and vice versa (needs a reference). Phenomenology helps to grasp the phenomenon and understand the essence of it. The use of IPA enabled exploration of interviewees' experiences with further abstraction and interpretation by the researchers, based on theoretical and personal knowledge.

Our research is devised to understand the nature of the phenomenon of communication, to communicate from the experiences and interpretations of artists and scientists in educational practice, and lends itself to

phenomenological research. However, the main focus of phenomenology is with pre-reflective experiences and feelings, and a key aspect of this research was thus exploring interviewees' experiences of their practices of communicating. Communication and language are intertwined and hermeneutics offers a way of understanding such human experiences captured through language and in context (van Manen, 1997). Language in general is a part of self-consciousness, indeed, part of the universal acknowledgement (world's and other people, language is a mediator (Hegel, 2004, p. 238). As Hegel (2012) wrote, language creates the way to know the community among all people, to understand the other and myself.

With regard to our current strategy, interview is the main data collection method. This method was chosen because it is congruent with the research paradigm and methodology, and it enabled access to interviewees' experiences. Important to note, that in hermeneutic phenomenology the interview serves very specific purposes. The phenomenological interviews used as a means for exploring and gathering of narratives of lived experiences, and thus gives the participants the freedom to respond to questions, and to narrate their experiences without being tied down to specific answers (Morse & Field, 1995). This may be achieved through reflection by the informant on the topic at hand (van Manen, 1997). To this end, we recorded conversations with scientists, artists, and educators who took part as instructors or participants in the EU Comenius project CREAT-IT's WASO course and related activities in Western Norway. They provided personal stories (experiences, feelings, incidents, etc.), and shared common experiences with cross-disciplinary art and science educational projects.

The interviews were conducted in January, February and August, 2015. Data analysis was based on IPA principles, inspired by Smith (2008): 1. Immersion and understanding; 2. Coding and grouping; 3. Interpretation and contextualization; 4. Integration and reporting.

The Researchers' Roles in Data Collection are as follows. Author 1 is a drama educator and leads the practice-based "Basics of Communication" and the "Theory of Drama Education" Masters Programs at a Lithuanian university. Author 2 focuses on phenomenology as a research methodology and its application in different areas of human sciences. Author 3 is the developer of the Write a Science Opera (WASO) methodology and coordinated the CREAT-IT project.

Overview of research findings

As was mentioned in the theoretical section above, artistic thinking is

born from inspiration and intuition which are often not bounded by factual and empirical evidence of the kind employed in science. Noted, that the striking feature of art communication is that the information normally comes from a subjective source, and later interpreted in a subjective viewpoint by the artist. We can make the assumption that looking from an artistic perspective, communication with science starts with intuition and symbols culled from a variety of sources of nature.

When I am working many years for the Natural Historic museum, and I have very close connection to the models of flowers and animals, I saw botanic collections, and I was using the nature things on my ceramic works, it was my first connection with science, and I think, art is creating something, science is learning something. There is some science in the art and some art in the science". (X1 interview 1)

It is noticed that artists often examine problems from different angles and interpret scientific information in a creative language. According to Bubaš (2014), the intended meaning is so vague that people will not immediately know what they are supposed to get from it, leading them to think that those who claim to "get" the meaning are simply imagining something. It seems that the subjective nature of art gives individual meaning and perception.

On my intuitive sense, which gives unique quality, through my conception and interpretation, others can see through their eyes what I have seen through my eyes. (X2 interview 2)

The artists are expressing both intuition and emotional concepts and a perspective of "seeing" the scientific world in a different position than before. They indicate that art is much *more than a tool* in science. The personal contact/dialogue with science helps them to change their approach and look more deeply and widely into what is "going on" between science and art. Furthermore, in the educational setting, an artist explores areas that relate to scientific theory and practice, but does not directly address the scientific method.

I remember, I had a different approach as an artist "<...>"I realize that approach to art is more diverse, the art can make science more interesting for kids, not only art like as a tool, but art like approach to science through imagination" <...>"I as a teacher of visual arts, art is interesting itself, of course, art can be used like a tool for science. It is not problem, but there exist differences, and both (art and science) are correct in different circumstances. (X1 interview 1).

Scientific thinking is a practical guide to inductive reasoning that implies the sort of reasoning that is commonly used in scientific activity such as performed by a scientist (Martin, 1997). The scientist who works intuitively and expresses himself logically is in some ways an artist. However, differences exist: the scientist's approach is more practical, and he looks to the art from a more pragmatic perspective.

I am interested in science and art, but I am scientist. We got interested in working with artists in master level, because here at University we see, that is a big challenge for master students to communicate with audiences.<...> For the artists it has been an interesting experience, because they don't usually meet scientists, and usually they have only the interpretation where (unintelligible) that is going on. (X 9 interview 9).

As far as evaluation is concerned, some scientists appreciate the value of the artistic activity for the increased understanding of the scientific content which it may provide.

Artists were able to meet the scientists and be able to help them interpret in an artistic way what actually is going on. The message, the scientific message, has to be conveyed by using in artistic format. That changes the content of expression for both participants, it is also really useful for the scientists have to make each other understand, what is actually happening (X 9 interview 9).

The scientist thinks methodically, using a set of principles called the scientific method in order to solve problems. This often includes the brainstorming of ideas about the current situation. Science asks questions which can be answered based on empirical evidence. The example below exemplifies scientists seeking contact with an audience. In the example, they would like to engage in dialogue with an audience because they acknowledge that scientific language sometimes seems incomprehensible and boring.

I do think that many scientists should have an open mind to this approach, and be encouraged to engage with them in the right context<...> "I think, sometimes scientific data seems like a monologue, but art can produce a dialogue. It can be a way of making your science more relevant, more impactful, and hopefully a bit more fun. (X8 interview 8).

There is evidence to suggest that, to a certain extent, communication in art and science builds upon different perspectives (subjective and objective)

of thinking. It would seem that there are several areas in which scientists and artists have different communication practices, and which lead to differing perceptions within the inter-disciplinary educational context. Scientific and artistic perception differences are not the only dimensions within which practitioners have different communication practices. It would therefore help to deepen our knowledge of the intersection between the disciplines, for the sake of future research.

Final remarks

Our research points towards, dialogue as central to the successful integration of our chosen fields. Yet there is no need for a complete merger of these two fields (disciplines): rather, the dialogue between arts and sciences should offer the needed skills towards developing clear messages, including the ability to communicate, solve problems, obtain and process information and analyze data in such a way that terminologies and approaches within both art and science are understood on both sides of the disciplinary borders (Straksiene, Batuchina & Ben Horin, 2017). This is true due to different approaches, methods, fields of the researches and sometimes, even audience. But we cannot forget that both science and art has the same aim – both are trying to know the world around us, whereas the forms of perceived knowledge and their expression are two of unlike.

Language in general is a part of self-consciousness, part of the universal acknowledgement (world's and other people, language is a mediator (Hegel, 2004, pp. 238). Yet language cannot be understood as the only way of communication. This is especially relevant, when we speak of practitioners of different disciplines such as artists and scientists, and of the complex phenomenon of dialogue between them.

To this end, Rorie (2010) emphasizes, art and science have deep histories of shared understanding: dialogue is thus not only possible, but highly recommended. Since through the dialogue, art teaches science to be creative, open-minded, helps to get inspiration while science gives the art the base for the new techniques, instruments and methods.

For future research it would be interesting to explore how to apply artistic strategies into scientific processes. We foresee an attempt to find methods which are not based on pure rationality, and whose existence may prove to be more of a paradigm than an empirically-based reality..

References

Akhutina, T.V. (2003). *The Theory of Verbal Communication in the Works*

- of M.M. Bakhtin and L.S. Vygotsky. *Journal of Russian and East European Psychology*. 41(3), 96–114. Available online: <http://www2.fcsh.unl.pt/psicolinguistica/docs/3Akhutina.pdf>
- Bubas, J. (2014). *Between Art and Science*. *Između umjetnosti i znanosti*. Available online: http://www.oris.hr/files/pdf/zastita/112/Oris.87_Invisible.Structures.pdf
- Bakhtin M., M. (1986). *Speech genres & other late essays*. University of Texas Press, Austin.
- Creswell, J. W. (2009). *Research design: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. 3rd Edition, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications.
- Ben-Horin, O. (2014). *The Write a Science Opera (WASO) Guidelines*. European Commission: The CREAT-IT Comenius Multilateral Project (Funded under Grant Agreement 2013 – 3637 / 001 - 001). See online access: <http://www.opendiscoveryspace.eu/edu-object/write-science-opera-waso-guidelines-820499>. Retrieved on Oct. 29th, 2016
- Garolian, C. R. & Mathews, J. D. “A common impulse in art and science”, *Leonardo* 29(3), 1996193-196,
- Hegel, G. W. (2012). *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, B&R Samizdat Express.
- . (2004). *The Phenomenology of Spirit (The Phenomenology of Mind)*, Digireads Publishing, 2004
- Lakoff G., & Johnson M. (1980). *Metaphors we live by*. The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London.
- Martin R., M. (1997). *Scientific thinking*. Broadview Press.
- Rorie, A. (2010) *Art & Science*. Lecture. Available online: (<https://www.almostscientific.com/2010/03/23/lecture-on-the-relationship-between-art-and-science/>)
- Smith, J. A. (2008). *Qualitative Psychology: A Practical Guide to Research Methods*. London: Sage.
- Smith, J. A. & Osborn. M. (2007). *Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis*. Available online: http://med-fom-familymed-research.sites.olt.ubc.ca/files/2012/03/IPA_Smith_Osborne21632.pdf
- The ArtScience Interfaculty. (2015). *Royal Academy of Art and Royal Conservatory in the Hague*. Available online: <http://www.interfaculty.nl/interfaculty/>.
- Straksiene, G. Batuchina, A. Ben Horin, (2017) Science and Art: A Phenomenological Approach to Developing a Dialogue. *The Educational Context in International Conference Proceedings “The Future of Education”*. Italy. Florence.
- van Manen, M. (2014). *Phenomenology of Practice*, California: Left Coast Press.

van Manen, M. (1990). *Researching lived experience: Human science for an action sensitive pedagogy*. Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York.

CHAPTER THREE

APPLICATION OF GIORGI'S EIDETIC PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHOD IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS

CRISTIANA BARBIERATO
VILNIUS UNIVERSITY, LITHUANIA

Abstract: Eidetic phenomenology derives from Husserl's (2002) ideas and aims to reveal essential features of a phenomenon via an eidetic description. Unlike other branches of phenomenology, the core of eidetic phenomenology is the phenomenon itself and not the perception of the meaning of the phenomenon in diverse experiences. This theoretical framework will be used to carry out the present analysis in the peculiarities of Giorgi's phenomenological method i.e. apart from the five methodological steps necessary to grasp the key structure of a phenomenon, three essential philosophic principles (phenomenological reduction, description and search for essence) and their elaboration in empirical research will be dealt with. As Giorgi's method (1985) has been constructed in the sphere of psychology, the article will tackle the problem of the applicability of the method outside the boundaries of psychological research in the first place. To have a deeper insight into the use of eidetic phenomenological method in educational research, some ideas proposed on the topic by Mortari (2010a, 2010b, 2007, 2003; Mortari & Saiani, 2013) will be reviewed with a specific emphasis on the theoretical and methodological perception of its *epoché*, virtues and principles of the phenomenological description and the concepts of eidetic and empirical essences. Having analyzed theoretical and methodological assumptions, the article further explores peculiarities of phenomenology and its paradoxical contribution to research: as a research methodology, phenomenology is not a protocol of safety instructions as its key prerequisites lie in the personal researcher's work that urges the researcher

to submerge into and experience epistemic dramas since the researcher is able to maintain the phenomenological approach, including epistemic vigilance, verification of assumptions and permanent openness to and esteem of the researched phenomenon, only by strictly following methodological issues.

Key words: eidetic phenomenology, eidetic phenomenological method in educology, phenomenological reduction, description, search for essence.

Introduction

What is meant by eidetic phenomenology and what do the authors constitute the point of reference for their research? The complexity of the concept of phenomenology has been discussed by numerous authors. Mickūnas states that phenomenology is not a rigorous school or a uniform philosophical subject and emphasizes that philosophers working in the traditional phenomenological framework maintain different approaches (Mickūnas & Stewart, 1994). Phenomenology is also described as a new way of reflecting and exploring the world (Labastida, 2004) or a way of developing attitudes (Artoni & Tarozzi, 2010). Thus, it is crucial to define in advance how the concept is to be used in this article.

Phenomenology is a 20th century philosophical movement with its roots in the works of Husserl who criticized the positions of psychologism and reductionism and attempted to develop a new method of cognition grounding it on any previous assumptions. Eidetic phenomenology is a branch of phenomenology that aims at disclosing essential features of a phenomenon via an eidetic description. Unlike other branches of phenomenology, the core of eidetic phenomenology is the phenomenon itself and not the perception of the meaning of the phenomenon in diverse experiences. Eidetic phenomenology, not only as a philosophy but also as an approach towards research methodology, emphasizes objective nature, its structural features and invariables of a phenomenon that remain the same independently on variation and constitute its invariable essence. Eidetic phenomenology focuses on the description of the individual's experiences instead of analyzing a subjective individual's perceptions since the goal of research is to approach the "transcendental phenomenon" as close as possible.

As it has already been mentioned, eidetic phenomenology, also referred to as transcendental or descriptive phenomenology, stems from Husserl's works (2002, 1981) and has been developed further by his successors ascribed as the Duquesne School.

Another approach maintained by the Heideggerian Hermeneutics School follows Heideggerian phenomenological assumptions and emphasizes the role of personal lived experience and interpretive analysis in the perception of a phenomenon (Mortari, 2007).

The complex nature of phenomenology precludes it from fitting into a rigid framework. Thus, scholars are still attempting to integrate the two aforementioned branches of phenomenology on a theoretical and methodological level (the Dutch School of Phenomenology) and in scientific publications (Churchill, Deschênes & Thiboutot 2016).

Another important clarification in the context of phenomenology is associated with the eidetic descriptive method, a term describing works by various authors, e.g. Colaizzi (1978), van Kaam (1966), Moustakas (1994) and Giorgi (1985). The present publication focuses on Giorgi's eidetic phenomenological method.

The objective of this article is to disclose theoretical and methodological assumptions of application of Giorgi's eidetic phenomenological method in educational research.

The goals of this article are:

- to discuss the methodological steps and essential philosophical principles of Giorgi's eidetic phenomenological method;
- to explore possibilities to apply Giorgi's method outside the boundaries of psychological research;
- to compare theoretical and methodological assumptions of application of Giorgi's and Mortari's eidetic phenomenological method in educology;
- to highlight requirements necessary for the researcher to maintain the phenomenological approach.

Giorgi's eidetic phenomenological method: five methodological steps and three philosophical principles

In the sixties and seventies of the 20th century, American psychologist Amedeo Giorgi, being dissatisfied with the contemporary situation in psychology, started to search for a new approach towards the subject and the individual. His subsequent studies in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and practice at Duquesne University led him toward creation of the phenomenological research method. This method has been introduced in a range of scientific publications (Giorgi, 1985, 1997, 2006a, 2006b, 2010, 2012; Giorgi & Giorgi 2003). Giorgi's eidetic phenomenological method comprises five methodological steps that, according to the author, are necessary to grasp the essential structure of a

phenomenon:

- 1) recurrent reading of the received text to allow perception of the described as a whole;
- 2) distinction of conceptual units in the text that are meaningful in the field of the research and the phenomenon itself;
- 3) transformation of the natural language of informants into the language of the research field and the phenomenon;
- 4) attempting to disclose the essential structure of the phenomenon by means of the free variation method and the disclosed and described essentials;
- 5) final synthesis
(Giorgi, 1985, 1997; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003).

Apart from the five methodological steps, Giorgi emphasizes three essential philosophical principles (phenomenological reduction, description and search for essence) and analyzes their elaboration in empirical research.

For connoisseurs of phenomenology, reduction, description and search for essence are the key words of phenomenology, the actualization of which requires the full absorption of continuous reflection. The scientific literature on phenomenological research, although with a different degree of emphasis, always introduces and earmarks those principles as the exceptional features of phenomenological research that are not necessary in other versions of qualitative research¹. Inexperienced researchers, having no full understanding of the elements of phenomenology, tend to make light of the aforementioned principles and focus on what they think is more important and specific, namely the five steps specified by Giorgi. Having analyzed Giorgi's eidetic phenomenological method, it becomes obvious that the latter approach is inaccurate, and the three principles are more than merely introductory methodological assumptions as they give sense and form to the entire course and nature of research.

Another aspect described in scientific publications links the essential philosophical principles (phenomenological reduction, description and search for essence) with the validity of research (Sousa, 2014). Giorgi (1997) and treats them as criteria of validity and necessary elements of phenomenological research. Also, without a solid reference to the three principles, the specified five steps lose their meaning and turn into external

¹ For instance, the presence of research reduction is deemed an essential element distinguishing phenomenological description from any other type of the qualitative description (Willis et al.,2016).

instructions of a general nature that may be applicable in methodologies of any qualitative research.

The problem of the applicability of the method

Mortari states that the eidetic phenomenological method has roots in the sphere of psychology where it gradually acquired a solid theoretical and practical foundation and only later found its application in nursing research (Mortari, 2007)².

The application of the eidetic phenomenological method in educology is rare³ since research in the field traditionally rests upon van Manen's works and his school, where the method is understood in its hermeneutic/interpretative sense.

Hence, it is necessary to justify the applicability of the eidetic phenomenological method first and only then discuss the ways and assumptions to be followed in educational research based on the method.

Giorgi (2012) raises the question and justifies opportunities to apply his method by highlighting its phenomenological nature and how it evolved from Husserl's phenomenology. Due to its epistemic approaches, the method distinguishes a new philosophical way to perceive reality. In that sense, it is universal and applicable to the entire cognitive range.

I have used psychology as an example to show how a phenomenological approach can be used. That is because I am a psychologist and that was the discipline with which I worked out the development of the phenomenological psychological method. However, I want to make clear that the phenomenological method is generic enough to be applied to any human or social science—sociology, anthropology, pedagogy, etc. The only difference is that one assumes the attitude of the discipline within which one is working: pedagogical if it is pedagogy, sociological if sociology, etc., instead of a psychological attitude. One would then have a pedagogical or sociological phenomenological method (Giorgi, 2012, pp. 11).

To sum up, it may be stated that according to Giorgi, his method is

² A description of how the Colaizzi method applies in nursing research may be found in Shosha, 2012.

³ An example of the method application in the field of educology by Moustak has been presented by Eddles-Hirsch, 2015. Phenomenology as a scientific approach in educology is described by Yüksel & Yıldırım, 2015; however, the phenomenological focus of the article is vague, and the content fails to distinguish discussions of eidetic nature from the notes reflecting phenomenological hermeneutic / interpretative aspects.

applicable in other scientific fields because first it is phenomenological, and only then it is psychological.

Towards a comparison of Giorgi's and Mortari's methods

Giorgi emphasizes that "the method should not be taken as a receipt" (2006a, pp. 306) and stresses that phenomenology itself has no uniform orthodox canon (2006b) to be followed to the letter or replicated. Thus, we arrive at a conclusion that considerations of the possibilities of applying the phenomenological method in other scientific fields, namely in the science of education, should focus rather on a theoretical or philosophical level than on retrieval of safe and invariable practical instructions. A methodology and phenomenology expert at Verona University, Mortari has thoroughly researched the eidetic phenomenological method in educology and nursing with reference to Giorgi and other authors working in the field of eidetic phenomenology (Mortari, 2010a, 210b, 2007, 2003; Mortari & Saiani, 2013). Therefore, a further step in this article will be a comparison or juxtaposition of Giorgi's method and theoretical and methodological assumptions on the eidetic phenomenological method in educology suggested by Mortari. The core of the interpretation will comprise analysis of the three phenomenological principles since, as it has already been mentioned, the phenomenological reduction, description and search for the essentials virtually reveal the specific nature of the eidetic phenomenological method.

Notes on reduction – *epoché*

Giorgi (1997) analyzes phenomenological reduction with a philosophical approach and emphasizes its two aspects with reference to Husserl's ideas. The first aspect describes reduction as a bracketing that is necessary to "voice" a phenomenon. In this respect, reduction is earmarked as a method to touch the profoundness of reality way to compass into the abyss of reality, since an ordinary glimpse into reality is typically enclosed within the boundaries of natural assumptions, and therefore, reduces it by following guidelines of causative links. Another aspect is that phenomenology raises no questions of the existence of reality. Instead, it follows another route; namely, it researches how things (particularly subjects of consciousness or phenomena) manifest themselves in experience, i.e. researches what exists or emerges in real experience.

In that sense, reduction is perceived as abstention from the evaluation of the substantiality of a phenomenon and focus on the way the

phenomenon appears.

In the context of empirical research, Giorgi (1997), distinguishes, along with the aforementioned aspects, two additional meanings of reduction, namely, the perspectives of a scientific field to analyze a certain aspect of reality and the inevitable proximity or sensitivity of the researcher to the researched phenomenon. Another aspect is associated with the researcher's habit to declare their theoretical position with the aim at maintaining the utmost objectivity of future conclusions. Giorgi highlights the deficiency of such a declaration because it constitutes a risk to getting entangled by personal anticipatory assumptions.

Before starting to analyze Mortari's contribution to the perception of reduction, it is necessary to specify in advance that she uses term *epoché* in the sense of reduction and discloses the topic on different levels: theoretical and methodological.

The theoretical necessity of *epoché* is visually introduced by reference to Arendt's idea about the process of reasoning as the process of watching through a banister (Mortari, 2010a): our observations and reflections are never neutral; they are always local and thus have to be cleared of epistemic theoretical lime. It takes *epoché* to have clear observations and reflections. Particularly forceful is Mortari's urging to take *epoché* not as a cleanup of the mind, but as a new attitude towards our cognition. The ways and conditions of our reflections on and perceptions of reality inevitably acting as filters of phenomena and precluding their immediate cognition are turned via *epoché* into "levers" or starting points for a more open approach and a new cognition of reality (Mortari, 2013). Since a researcher's *epoché* is perceived not as an instantaneous bracketing, but as continuous process, it is further elaborated on a methodological level. One may refer to it as a prior-to-research *epoché* and an in-research *epoché*. In the first case, the researcher, prior to starting an interview, for example, has to describe personal experiences, visions and expectations as to the phenomenon under research and the corresponding empirical research. In the second case, the emphasis is on the researcher's awareness of the theoretical background of the subject. Although theoretical knowledge is taken into consideration, it is not to be used to formulate topics and to disclose essential features of the phenomenon.

To facilitate the use of *epoché*, Mortari suggests writing memos or diaries (2003; 2007; 2010a): they are quite common in qualitative research, but in the context of phenomenology, they constitute a place of self-cognition (a means of reflections and self-analysis) allowing the researcher to have a deeper insight into their work and contemplate and maintain epistemic awareness of their ideas. Memos typically contain the theoretical

or methodological reflections and arrangements of the researcher. Note taking may be twofold: a research agenda (it. *agenda*) or a researcher memo (it. *meta-agenda* or *quaderno della vita della mente*). Research agendas usually include the history, evolution or development of or new findings and directions in the research, whereas memos basically focus on a researcher's epistemic solutions, reflections or assumptions emerging in the course of analysis or research, e.g. before or after an interview. According to Mortari, memo writing actually becomes an epistemic reflection which testifies to a researcher's attempts to maintain loyalty to the researched phenomenon and implies a certain perception of the method referred to as *a-methodical* method (Mortari 2006; 2007; 2013). The author compares phenomenological research to Penelope's work at the weaving loom, where the fabric produced in a day is unwoven overnight (2006). "Weaving" a phenomenological research is a continuous unravelling and reflection; it is an epistemic watch and a repetitive return to the collected data with the aim of approaching and unfolding the phenomenon.

Notes on phenomenological description

The act of description is characteristic to other methods of qualitative research as well; therefore, scholars address the topic with the aim of finding singularities of the method in the context of phenomenology. In the context of eidetic phenomenology, Giorgi interprets description as a way to render an accounting of a phenomenon in order to reveal it to the consciousness. With reference to Merleau-Ponty's insights, Giorgi points out that, unlike explanation, construction or interpretation, description is a continuous review and refinement of the collected data excluding any external attitudes and is based entirely on what the phenomenon discloses itself (1997). He also adds that the perception of description as staying in the immediate vicinity of the way of phenomenon manifestation is characteristic to Husserl's tradition, whereas Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology maintains a different understanding.

In his attempts to identify distinctive features of the two positions, Applebaum states that "a phenomenological descriptive research aims to clearly express, denominate or make explicit the implicit meanings of a phenomenon" (2007, p. 72). The descriptive phenomenological research maintains an assumption that a phenomenon already contains its meaning, which has to be identified or discovered, whereas researchers advocating an interpretive position believe that the meaning of a phenomenon is not implicit and has to be constructed or created (2007).

As for the role description plays in research, Giorgi emphasizes aspects of concreteness and particularity that are necessary in descriptions of phenomena experienced by others (1997). To put it another way, people describe experienced phenomena from the perspective of everyday life based on their natural attitudes. However, the role of a researcher is to write out and translate experiences described by people phenomenologically and in accordance with the scientific field since the goal of research is not to merely interpret experiences, but to attain an adequate understanding of the phenomenon (2006b).

How does Mortari understand phenomenological description and what elements does she specify as essential? Responses to the aforementioned questions lead to the conclusion that the treatment of the topic is earmarked by loyalty to the phenomenon and particular attention paid to the phenomenological use of language. The first aspect manifests itself in the concepts of epistemic principles and virtues which will be discussed further. Mortari highlights two epistemic principles of the phenomenological method that shape the further work of a researcher: evidence and transcendence (2007). The principle of evidence emphasizes the necessity to maintain loyalty to manifestations of the phenomenon, i.e. what and how the phenomenon exhibits. The principle of transcendence entails the inevitable mystery and intangibility of the phenomenon. When subsistence or a phenomenon manifests itself, it is not always possible to completely observe its manifestation – a part of it may be implicit and invisible. Application of the principle of transcendence means paying particular attention to the hidden part of a visible item. The principles closely associate with two epistemic virtues: respect (it. *rispetto*) and humility (it. *umiltà*) (2007). Speaking about the virtue of respect, Mortari encourages the researcher to pay attention to every detail of phenomenon manifestation because what may seem insignificant or secondary at first sight may contain a meaningful shade of the phenomenon. The virtue of humility means that, outside the boundaries of the obvious, there is a great risk of error or deviation from authenticity of the phenomenon. A researcher risks facing the phenomenon only mentally and without a scientific cognitive approach. Therefore, a researcher should always act in the spirit of humility towards the phenomenon. The second feature of phenomenological description is associated with the use of language. Here, Giorgi believes that the application of the principle of philosophic description in empirical research leads towards the change of the register, i.e. the shift from the natural language of informants to the phenomenological lexis of the corresponding scientific field. In the context of the use of language, Mortari refers to Zambrano's call to search for

subsistence associated words and distinguishes two phenomenological language rules to be followed in research description (2007). First, to avoid the shading of the phenomenon by the used language and to protect and facilitate its manifestation, the researcher must be extremely careful and purposeful in the choice of words: wording must be economic and meaningful. Second, the researcher is urged to somehow liberate the chosen words from their obvious implications so that the wording is as purposive as possible and corresponded to the initial meaning of the used words. Thus, *epoché* extends to linguistic solutions, and the process of writing becomes a sort of a continuous rotation around the phenomenon to allow a better insight into the phenomenon and a possibility to describe it in a simple and purposeful manner as if the phenomenon spoke itself (Mortari 2010a).

Another aspect of description is the so-called paradox of description. Considering the summation of the results of a description, Giorgi (2006b) draws attention to the fact that the topic reveals another aspect of the paradoxical nature of phenomenology: the universal structure of the phenomenon is usually probed via individual, although abundant and explicit, descriptions. To put it another way, instruments that are actually limited are invoked to approach what purports to become a universal reflection of the phenomenon. Mortari understands this epistemic contradiction in a similar manner and tackles the question by invoking a metaphor of a painting (Mortari 2007). Like a pointillism piece of art is composed of small dots to reveal an integral image, the structure of a phenomenon in a phenomenological description is composed of smaller component descriptions.

Notes on the search for essence

The search for essence constitutes the third aspect of the philosophical method of phenomenology. Referring to Husserl's ideas, Giorgi points out that, unlike in Plato's paradigm, an essence is perceived not as an idea, but as “a fundamental meaning without which a phenomenon could not present itself as it is” (1997, p. 242). He further submits that an essence “is a constant identity that holds together and limits the variations that a phenomenon can undergo” (1997, p. 244). Whereas Husserl maintains that essences may be individual, typical and universal, Giorgi, having referred to the idea, acknowledges that essences in empirical research are less extensive and more contextualized according to the scientific field (1997).

Mortari also acknowledges the diversity and complex nature of essences and distinguishes the eidetic essence, which constitutes the goal

of a theoretical research, from an empirical essence, which is sought in an empirical research (2013). Due to its specificity and variable nature of knowledge, an empirical research may not purport to approach the eidetic essence, but may help approach specificity and individual manifestations of a phenomenon.

The difference between the eidetic and empirical sciences is the following: eidetic sciences tells us what the essence of anything in general consists of (tells us what a language is, what a living being is, what a flower is and hence what an educational practice is...); empirical sciences have to look for a concrete essence of the phenomenon in question, examining an adequate number of manifestations of that phenomenon, that is a class of objects that are all active modes of the object in question (2010b, p.11 ad hoc translation from Italian).

It has to be noted that the distinction between an eidetic and an empirical essence should not be understood as a deviation towards epistemic skepticism. Although the eidetic essence may not be the goal of an empirical research, *de facto* it preconditions opportunities of empirical cognition of the essence (2010a).

According to Mortari (2010b; 2013), empirical features constituting an empirical essence may be:

- ✓ general – inherent to all manifestations,
- ✓ extensive – frequently observed,
- ✓ partial,
- ✓ local – observed only in a single manifestation of a phenomenon.

Giorgi and Mortari use different wording to express the same idea, namely, that the search of the essences in an empirical research has to be based on a thorough and extensive approach allowing inclusion of the multiple nature of reality or phenomena. Giorgi claims that his approach towards redundancies has changed: formerly, he considered them insignificant as redundancies seemed to be a sort of a repetitive part of a phenomenon on an empirical level; later, he adopted another approach to consider redundancies as an opportunity to add a new meaning to the perception of a phenomenon in (e.g. in a psychological sense) (2006a). With reference to Arendt's idea about the dual nature of a human being – concurrent similarity to and distinction from others – Mortari (2010b) emphasizes the importance of common features of a phenomenon along with its less common unique aspects as the validation tag in empirical research is the essence which expresses what is common and points out what is different.

Conclusions

Having analyzed Giorgi's and Mortari's theoretical and methodological assumptions, several conclusions may be arrived at.

Phenomenology differs from other methodologies and techniques of qualitative research in its philosophical background and requires a researcher's full absorption into its philosophic depth – a unique feature and a serious challenge of phenomenology. Knowledge of the philosophical background of phenomenology is a prerequisite condition of phenomenological empirical research – an idea equally maintained by Giorgi and Mortari. Whereas Husserl urged a return back to the things themselves,' Mortari urges a return to the immediate phenomenological sources (Mortari, 2007). Having acknowledged Husserl's complexity, Giorgi recommends Zahavi and Mohanty to those who wish to adopt phenomenology as an approach to their research (Applebaum, 2012). Mortari maintains the same position; although, being an educologist, he recommends other authors: Edith Stein, Maria Zambrano, Simon Weil and Emmanuel Levinas. In any case, the reference to phenomenology theoreticians is the key to perceiving and submerging into phenomenological work.

Giorgi's and Mortari's comparison of the three philosophical principles has highlighted the idea that the application of the phenomenological eidetic method in social sciences takes concentration on theoretical backgrounds, which, seemingly abstract and remote from the concreteness of empirical research, sheds light on further practical stages of a phenomenology based research.

Another aspect arising from the comparison is the paradoxical nature of the contribution of phenomenology to empirical research. Phenomenology as a research methodology manifests itself not as a protocol of safety instructions, that actually would be difficult to form due to the absence of expedient and explicit methodological references, but as a means for the researcher to develop and maintain a certain approach in terms of the researcher's personal work that urges the researcher to submerge into and experience epistemic dramas since the researcher is able to maintain the phenomenological approach, including epistemic vigilance, verification of assumptions and permanent openness to and esteem of the researched phenomenon, only by strictly following methodological issues.

References

- Applebaum, M. (2012, Jul 16). Amedeo Giorgi: A Life in Phenomenology. Retrieved from <http://phenomenologyblog.com/?p=485>
- . (2007). Considerazioni critiche sui metodi fenomenologici di Moustakas e di Van Manen. *Encyclopaideia*, 21, 65-76.
- Artoni, M., & Tarozzi, M. (2010). Fenomenologia come metodo e filosofia di ricerca nelle scienze umane. *Encyclopaideia*, 27, 11-22.
- Churchill, S. D., Deschênes, A. C., & Thiboutot, C. (2016). Les dimensions descriptives et interprétatives de la recherche phénoménologique. Complémentaires ou mutuellement exclusives? *RECHERCHES QUALITATIVES*, 35(2), 45-63.
- Colaizzi, P. (1978). Psychological research as the phenomenologist views it. In: Valle RS, King M (eds) *Existential phenomenological alternatives for psychology*. Oxford University Press, New York.
- Eddles-Hirsch, K. (2015). Phenomenology and Educational Research. *International Journal of Advanced Research*, 3(8), 251-260.
- Giorgi, A. (2012). The Descriptive Phenomenological Psychological Method. *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology*, 43(1), 3-12.
- . (2010). Introduzione al metodo fenomenologico descrittivo: l'uso in campo psicologico. *Encyclopaideia*, (27), 23-33.
- . (2006a). Concerning Variations in the Application of the Phenomenological Method. *The Humanistic Psychologist*, 34(4), 305-319.
- . (2006b). Difficulties encountered in the application of the phenomenological method in the social sciences. *Análise Psicológica*, 24(3), 353-361.
- . (1997). The theory, practice, and evaluation of the phenomenological method as a qualitative research procedure. *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology*, 28(2), 235-260.
- . (1985). Sketch of a psychological phenomenological method. *Phenomenology and psychological research*, 1, 23-85.
- Giorgi, A. and Giorgi, B. (2003). *Phenomenology*. In Smith J.A. (ed.), *Qualitative psychology: a practical guide to research methods*. London: Sage.
- Husserl, E. (2002). *Idee per una fenomenologia pura e per una filosofia fenomenologica* (Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie). Vol. I-II. Italian translation by E. Filippini, ed. V. Costa. Torino: Einaudi, 8.
- . (1981). *L'idea della fenomenologia*, trad. it. di A. Vasa e M. Rosso, il Saggiatore, Milano.

- Labastida, F. F. (2004). Fenomenologia eidetica e fondazione della conoscenza. *Acta Philosophica: rivista internazionale di filosofia*, 13(2), 293-304.
- Mickūnas, A., & Stewart, D. (1994). *Fenomenologinė filosofija*. Vilnius: Baltos lankos.
- Mortari, L., & Saiani, L. (2013). *Gesti e pensieri di cura*. Milano: McGraw-Hill.
- Mortari, L. (2010a). Cercare il rigore metodologico per una ricerca pedagogica scientificamente fondata. *Education Sciences & Society*, 1(1), 143-156.
- . (Ed.). (2010b). *Dire la Pratica: la cultura del fare scuola*. Milano: Bruno Mondadori.
- . (2007). *Cultura della ricerca e pedagogia: prospettive epistemologiche*. Roma: Carocci.
- . (2006). Un metodo a-metodico. *La pratica della ricerca in María Zambrano*. Liguori: Napoli.
- . (2003). *Apprendere dall'esperienza: il pensare riflessivo nella formazione*. Roma: Carocci editore.
- Moustakas, C. (1994). *Phenomenological research methods*. Sage.
- Shosha, G. A. (2012). Employment of Colaizzi's strategy in descriptive phenomenology: A reflection of a researcher. *European Scientific Journal*, 8(27), 31-43.
- Sousa, D. (2014). Validation in qualitative research: General aspects and specificities of the descriptive phenomenological method. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 11(2), 211-227.
- Van Kaam, A. (1966). Existential foundations of Psychology.
- Yüksel, P., & Yıldırım, S. (2015). Theoretical frameworks, methods, and procedures for conducting phenomenological studies in educational settings. *Turkish online journal of qualitative inquiry*, 6(1), 1-20.
- Willis, D. G., Sullivan-Bolyai, S., Knafl, K., & Zichi-Cohen, M. (2016). Distinguishing features and similarities between descriptive phenomenological and qualitative description research. *Western journal of nursing research*, 38(9), 1185-1204.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONSCIENCE AS *THE OTHER*: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ACTING CONSCIOUSNESS AND JUDGING CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE NOVEL *BLŪDAS* BY JULIJONAS LINDĖ-DOBILAS

SKAISTĖ BARKUTĖ

KLAIPĖDA UNIVERSITY, LITHUANIA

Abstract: The aim of the article is to reveal the articulation of a conflict between the protagonist's experience and beliefs of conscience in Julijonas Lindė-Dobilas's novel *Blūdas* (1912): analysis of the states of the character's consciousness, sensory perceptions and his "wanderings" along the paths of memories is implemented by reconstructing the relationship of his "I" and Other-I (conscience), reflections of his inner and outer connections, as well as transformations of self-experience. The creative consciousness accustoms to the text and conveys its own experience of the world; thus, when analysing emotions, struggles and reflections of experience of the character of the novel, the phenomenon and processes that are revealed in his consciousness may be partly considered as reflections of experience and perceived meaning of the creator (author). By means of philosophy of phenomenology, the literary work appears to be the most suitable space to demonstrate features of the relationship between the living world and the experience of the affected himself. Literature highlights how complex movements of consciousness are revealed from the human experience and reflection of such experience in the cultivated text. By examining the reflections of the character's experience and feelings, analysing the occurring intentional acts and their relationship with the living world, it shall be sought to reveal how the self-identification process of the character and reflection of one's identity are carried out through the *Other* (conscience and factors that formed it). Accordingly, the *Other* becomes especially important, not as another person, but as another part of one's personality – the judging

consciousness or conscience.

Key words: acting consciousness, judging consciousness, conscience, reflection, experience.

Introduction. Literature and Philosophy

An American philosopher Natanson (1962) claims that the relationship between literature and philosophy implies that a literary work helps to illuminate the transcendental structure of common-sense experience. Literature and philosophy have a common task: to reconstruct the earthly existence. According to the scientist, the world of direct existence is radically different from the visual perception of the world that is shaped by natural sciences, sociology and history (Natanson, 1962). The tension between philosophy and literature often implies confusion due to the importance of the following disciplines to one another (Natanson, 1962). Natanson (1962) highlights the distinction between the concepts of philosophy of literature and philosophy in literature. The first notion, the philosopher argues, deals with issues in formal aesthetics; the second one – denotes the philosophical dimension of literature. Philosophy in literature appears when one deals with the question of Being, i.e. the author is asking not how the reality is expressed, but what that reality is based on. Philosophy in literature is an attempt to reveal what is implicitly hidden in an artwork. Even though philosophy of literature may touch upon the concept of reality, philosophy in literature deals with the real analysis of experience recorded in the work. Finally, Natanson claims, philosophy in literature can help to understand what causes us to call a literary work philosophical. The work shall not be philosophical merely because of the ethical, temporal or the meaning-of-death questions discussed therein. Literature becomes philosophical when it forces us to return to the phenomenon of our own being, i.e. our experienced reality and essential ways of experiencing it, whereas philosophy of literature may complicate the following understanding as it distracts from the phenomenon and by giving way to theory, abandons the literary work (Natanson, 1962).

According to Merleau-Ponty (1980), phenomenology:

tries to give a direct description of our experience as it is, without taking into account of its psychological origin and the causal explanations which the scientists, the historian or the sociologist may be able to provide. [...] The world can be understood only as reflection, because it reveals that world as strange and paradoxical

(Merlo-Ponti [Merleau-Ponty], 1980, pp. 94, 99).

By means of philosophy of phenomenology, the literary work may seem to be the most suitable space to demonstrate features of the relationship between the living world and the experience of the affected himself. Literature highlights how text is cultivated from human experience and reflection of such experience, and how complex movements of consciousness are revealed in the following text. Daujotytė (2010) believes that philosophy of phenomenology strives for the “rich, diverse, beautiful and tragic human *living world* [depicted in literature] to be as adequately understood and reflected as possible; for the senses, smells, the hearing and sight to remain, perception to be filled, so that there were not only abstractions and frames” (Daujotytė, 2010, p. 24). The one, who perceives a literary work finds himself in the presence of two worlds: daily and literary. Together these worlds imply a direct survival of their experience. The outside world may limit the perception of experience, but being present “in it” enables us to directly reflect on the experience of the following world. Natanson (1962) claims that we are given not the world itself, but its horizon with things, events and states; thus, the world is perceived through the primary horizon of its being. In daily life, the horizon of the world is presented to a person and is an essential part of the world experience (Natanson, 1962, pp. 89-90). We perceive the literary microcosm as a world, we understand that the described story is global. According to Natanson (1962) whenever we say that a literary work highlights our own lives, we express the conviction that the way we intuitively feel the world has a real basis (Natanson, 1962, p. 93). Even though when entering the world of literature we must fold our daily beliefs, we must admit that our living, surrounding world does not cease to exist; by leaving our world, we bring our own thinking, our own memory, our own curiosity into the literary microcosm (Natanson, 1962, p. 97). The creative consciousness accustoms to the text and conveys its own experience of the world; thus, when analysing emotions, struggles and reflections of experience of the character of the novel, the phenomena and processes that are revealed in his consciousness may be partly considered as reflections of experience and perceived meaning of the creator (author). Phenomenological analysis of the fictitious consciousness allows to reveal the transcendental structure of everyday life (*ibid.*).

The aim of the article is related to the articulated collision between the experience of the protagonist and one’s beliefs of consciousness in Julijonas Lindė-Dobilas’s novel *Blūdas*. By examining the reflections of the character’s experiences and feelings, analysing the occurring

intentional acts and their relationship with the living world, it shall be sought to reveal how the self-identification process of the character and reflection of one's identity are carried out through the *Other*. The article highlights the relationship between the acting and judging consciousness, where the *Other* becomes especially important, not as another person, but as another part of one's personality, conscience of an individual. Analysis invokes theoretical perspectives of Ricoeur's, Buber's, Merleau-Ponty's, Natanson's, Jonkus's philosophy of phenomenology, Howard's moral philosophy.

Dialectics of conscience: between Selfhood and Otherness

Ricoeur (1992) states that the phenomenon of conscience belongs to a type of dialectics, when the acting consciousness confronts the judging (assessing) one. Forgiveness is the sign of the authenticity of the phenomenon of conscience, i.e. the result of recognizing each other by the following two antagonists, who understand their limits. Conscience that has a dialectical form of individuality and otherness is most clearly revealed through the voice or call (referral) metaphor, which often constitutes the notion of the phenomenon of a prescriptive nature where the significance of dimension of otherness (*Other*) is greatly highlighted. The link between the conscience and the judging and acting consciousness, as well as the following division of the consciousness, signify the ambiguous position of the *Other* in the phenomenon of conscience and the fact that the conscience is the commanding voice of the Other. According to Ricoeur (1992), the relationship between the conscience and the person it "addresses" can be identified as vertical; thus, the collision between the conscience of an individual and commitments that it undertakes may encourage the voice of the conscience to reduce the verdict of an authority (church, court, etc.) (Ricoeur 1992, 341–351).

Buber (2001) claims that a period may be observed in the thinking process, when a certain "inner" instance is questioned and listened to. However, Buber argues, even when this "inner" instance quests and tests the already completed thought, there exists another dialogue form: "decision is required not from the empirical I, but from the [...] spirit once guided by me, reflection-I, to whom a new thought is presented in order for one to know it [...]" (Buber 2001, 81). Accordingly, there appears a need for a purely interactive quotient, when the "inner" instance-You is solely thinking, "but remarkably lively and "different", or embodied in any well-known person" (ibid.). Moreover, Buber notices, "we are dealing not with a You, who [...] tends to philosophize only once, but with an

opposing You, who opposes as he is the real Other; his peculiarity of thinking otherwise and differently [...] is absorbed into one's own thinking, reflected upon, and thus addressed in one's thoughts" (ibid., 83).

Ricoeur (2001) states that guilt clearly emphasizes subjectivity; it shows that consciousness bears an intolerable burden, that remorse of conscience is an inner torment, while metaphors of burden and torment show damage in the context of existence. However, having metaphorically moved the court into the "internal forum", it becomes "moral consciousness"; thus, guilt becomes a way to appear before a kind of an invisible court, which follows, judges and condemns. According to Ricoeur, perception of guilt coincides with the infliction of punishment, i.e. guilt is self-tracking, self-incrimination and self-condemnation of a broken consciousness (Ricoeur, 2001, p. 116). The author claims that experience of remorse of conscience implies the experience of the dialectical relationship between freedom and responsibility. The following is the recognition (ability) of what is mandatory, and at the same time admission that one acted not according to the compulsory recognized law. Freedom is the power to act as one understands the law, disregarding one's duties.

Ricoeur (2001) observes that a peculiar (sometimes pathological) awareness, which may be called scruple, appears together with guilt. Scrupulous consciousness is subtle and sensitive, aspiring to the greatest possible perfection. According to Ricoeur, scruple reveals that moral consciousness becomes somehow pathologic: a scrupulous person takes cover in a confusing maze of precepts and doubts. A scrupulous consciousness constantly adds new precepts, while the obedience to a precept only because it is said so, distances the scrupulous from the simple precept to love God and people and shuts one away to hell of guilt (Ricoeur, 2001, p. 118). It is exactly this complicated relationship between the character and one's moral consciousness (scrupulous conscience) that may be observed in Lindė-Dobilas's novel. A very distinctive relationship between the foreman and his I (usually conscience) shall be particularly obvious as a relationship with the Other or Not-Me because of the need to understand (perceive) the unreflected past events coming back in memories and unconscious inner connections.

Character's polemic with his conscience: phenomenological analysis

Protagonist of the Lindė-Dobilas's novel *Blūdas* – foreman Petras Bajoriūnas – is a contemplative man, an observer. However, if externally he can not be called a person of action, and despite of being an observer,

the foreman carries out active actions within himself: remembers, rethinks about one's feelings and experiences, dreams and imagines, but most important – polemicalizes with one's "inner" instance. Categorical disapproval of parents, but most importantly reasons of such disapproval – the girl is a simple maid – father's derision ("stallion") and mother's tears ("what shall people say?") were so effective that the character changes overnight and from the world full of dreams and romantic feelings, which he calls a dark cave in the morning, "returns" to the everyday reality, where there is no Jievitė and everybody lives "as it should be" according to the wishes of parents, i.e. give up their freedom to act according to how one understands and what is right. Taking into account information that we get to know from the description that later the foreman tries to live without opposing the prevailing traditional ethical and religious consciousness, which acts as a collective consciousness of moral norms (avoids one's friends and loved ones), it can be assumed that the narrator implicitly wants to say that the radical change was not the result of his true deliberate decision, but consequence of the external violence (due to parents' criticism and public opinion) and unbridled consciousness. It is interesting to notice that at the beginning experienced things reach the foreman to a large extent through his sight and hearing; he begins to assess everything: moods of people, gesticulation, behaviour, facial colour and expressions, voice intonation. Nevertheless, he is especially influenced by what he hears – the content, which is reflected and assessed by the foreman from the perspective of the past experience, i.e. world-view beliefs and formed mentality. The moment of seeing a cross in the cemetery is very important. The tranquillity of the night contrasts with the seen images: passing through the cemetery Petriukas *realizes* that he is not completely alone (division of consciousness). This is how the duplicity of self is reflected, i.e. one's own conscience, which acts as a judging consciousness that reminds about oneself at the moment of previous religious experience (looking at the cross) and appears to the character as Other. Petras finds himself kind of confronted with this invisible, but corporeally felt Other (or conscience). Jonkus (2009) claims,

"selfhood is given not as pure present [...] but as a sphere of actualities and potentialities. Selfhood experience is not limited to what is actual, but also includes what is indirectly experienced as my past, transcendental abilities and habits" (Jonkus, 2009, p. 166).

In the following situation (at present), beliefs and habits formed by the

character in the past appear as an Other (conscience), who is warning and assessing actions; thus, not only did this Other “move in one’s heart”, but also perceptibly followed along, “ran past him; he gawked with his terrible eyes (it may be noticed that every time the character meets the righteous Other, he sees condemnation in the “terrible eyes”) from every stone, every cavity or a shrub” (Lindė-Dobilas, 1990, p. 50). The narrator, as an independent observer, wants to emphasize that the conclusion drawn by the character is inadequate and erroneous: “Even though Petriukas’ feelings for Jiebutė were pure, he yet considered them to be sinful” (ibid).

After describing the childhood and youth experiences of the character, the narrator actualizes present experience reflections of the foreman: “while driving, he was able to dream as much as possible”, but the following is followed by a clarification that it was “only his habit, but far away from ideal” (Lindė-Dobilas, 1990, p. 75). The narrator tells us that there is an inner attempt of the character, as it was in his childhood, to find an authentic relationship with oneself. However, later, as we shall see the reflections of the following experience appear as visual and audible images. Due to the fact that the character was raised in strict conditions and was not able to critically assess what was told in the priestly church, as well as why and how that was told, all his doubts concerning the issue were thought of as being sinful thoughts, while one’s consciousness was blocked by excited regret. Accordingly, authoritarian, not so much assessing, but more judging (accusing), *Other* within him, which he called the reproach of conscience, took on rather strong positions. The foreman as if conceives all that experience and sensory feelings, which are not related to traditions and prevailing customs, ignores them and strives to block in his consciousness. Analysis of the states of the foreman’s consciousness, sensory perceptions and his “wanderings” along the paths of memories, can be completed by the reconstruction of the relationship of the foreman’s “I” and Other-I (conscience), reflection of his inner and outer connections, as well as transformations of self-experience. The ability of the foreman’s consciousness to live through self-reflections as an intervention of the Other (when the Other is the contradicting part of the same personality) has already been discussed earlier. The protagonist of the novel observes and listens to the heated speech of the socialist, participates in debates between the priest and the tsar’s deputy, monitors the behaviour of good, sincere and malevolent people. Increasingly striving to find the right image of the world and solution to one’s problems, the foreman penetrates into the whirlwind of the reflection of all memories, feelings and experiences, providing oneself freedom of considerations-doubts and no longer trying to divide one’s thoughts into right and sinful.

Nevertheless, in all those activities of the consciousness, he must still experience the dictates of his excessively scrupulous conscience; conscience, which was shaped not only in the light of faith and love for God, but also literally adhering to rigid formulas and dogmas, as well as popular public beliefs (that often become mere superstitions). A certain “education” of one another may be noticed in the following dispute between the foreman (acting consciousness) and his conscience (judging consciousness): his conscience tells him everything what the foreman did not want to admit and what was very afraid of (Otherness of the Other). In turn, the character shapes the conscience, trying to provide it with maturity and refrain from scrupulousness. In various episodes, we find an unexpected manifestation of the personalized conscience, which “tells” the foreman the truth that was long tried to be avoided. Thomas Green notes that conscience and its leadership appear as if from somewhere else: from a distant, impartial, uninterested perspective. At the same time, it remains the most subjective interpretation of an individual’s life. Upon the moment described in the episode, the foreman passively faced his conscience, i.e. he experienced manifestations of the forms of the conscience, not taking into account the content of it. Howard (2014) states that when the content of conscience is not reflected, it speaks with us through its experiences and sufferings (Howard, 2014, p. 53). A similar situation may be observed with the case of the foreman. Conscience for the foreman was simply a tough *other* formed in his childhood, which had to tame his “wicked” thoughts and “inappropriate” behaviour. From the moment discussed, the foreman gradually begins to reflect on the content of conscience; thus, intensive processes begin to take place in his consciousness, his conscience takes on various forms. According to Howard (2014), conscience implies the power of self-identification, knowledge of various aspects of one’s identity, regardless whether an action performed in the past was reflected, it still remains an act that was performed. Despite the fact that the following ability or power of the conscience to identify oneself between how we see ourselves and how imperfect our actions are, is too psychologically determined, the following ability remains an essential component that allows to see our lives as authentically ours (Howard, 2014, p. 54). It seems that the following meeting with one’s conscience, the incentive for which was created by a whole set of events and experiences – public speech of the socialist on the square, his arrest and an intense situation while having dinner with the “official” in the rectory – allowed the foreman to carefully review one’s life, some moments of which were even unfamiliar to him (his dreams about the priest’s son and the lightning-like thought that he might also be such a bad priest that the foreman had

recently had to encounter: “Later [...] would suck that poor man’s blood together with sirs” (Lindè-Dobilas, 1990, p. 309). It is exactly this unchanging feature of the conscience – to emerge as a power, which is beyond the limits of our conscious control – that is particularly clearly revealed in the process of the foreman’s self-actualization (polemics of the acting and judging consciences). The following process turned out to be quite complicated and the battle – difficult. At the moment of crisis, we could identify a place, where the foreman’s conscience acquires a specific body form:

In the long run, he saw the owner of the voice. It was that teller, who spoke today in the Karklynkiemis. [...] The foreman was constantly shouting “Raving!”, shook his head, asked God for help, moved around his seat, but could not leave the strange speaker. [...] More than once did the foreman become so angry that was literally ready to attack him and split into pieces. None of this helped, the speaker spoke as before, from time to time rewarding the foreman with an insolent and cursory glance. [...] (Lindè-Dobilas, 1990, pp. 310-311)

As it was already mentioned earlier, the process of the foreman’s self-identity is complicated by the fact that his essential life experiences and background had not been reflected for a long time. Nevertheless, the reflecting beliefs that forge with the help of our conscience always help to improve my personality, even if it causes painful experiences of perception. The narrator reveals that the foreman “while resting after fighting all fears shoved his head [...] even though he was sure that the voice was coming from himself, yet somehow was looking in the end and on the mentioned things with suspicion” (Lindè-Dobilas, 1990, p. 311). Despite the apparent capitulation in the dispute between the foreman and his conscience, “every time the inferences [of the inner speaker] had become clearer and against one’s will seeped into the foreman’s head and heart” (ibid.) On one hand, the positive fact is that the foreman is becoming more aware of many things that before did not even dare to reflect upon and what greatly complicated the process of self-understanding. On the other hand, the flow of thoughts, feelings, images (“the image has so penetrated into his imagination, that it appeared so right: he heard a kind of bursting, very much like somebody would drip water on the crumpled coat [...] (ibid.) and perceptions that seized the foreman was obviously too great; therefore, it is increasingly difficult for him to withstand this workload – he does not understand what is happening with him and why. Not only did the foreman

need to understand the meaning of events and experiences, but, as a deeply religious and faithful person, in the flow of all reflections find a place for the questions of theological God's will, His actions and existence of evil. It was another issue that the foreman previously tried not to touch upon and refrain from reflecting: such things as reading the Holy Scripture, according to the narrator, were prohibited for "ordinary" people by the church and many priests. With the tension becoming greater in the foreman's head and heart, there is one event that saves him from this difficult situation: when he, unable to bear the difficulty of thoughts and not knowing what to do, whips the horse, the horse starts to run, frightens and almost turns the carriage upside down. While trying to understand what could have frightened the horse, the foreman meets his brother-in-law, and conversation with him allows the character to temporarily move away and distance from the thoughtful things. Taken leave of one's brother-in-law, the foreman Bajoriūnas suddenly notices how peaceful the nature is, how sweet is his native village, which, it seems, due to the sufferings of mankind, he had forgotten about. Nevertheless, having undergone a storm of moral feelings and their reflections, as well as sharp conflicts with one's conscience, the foreman changes. The following is perfectly illustrated by the narrator, who in detail describes how sensually and cheerfully the character enjoys the natural tranquillity: "The foreman looked somehow graciously at the birch, then at the elm-tree, then again at the birch and said: "Beautiful!" (ibid., p. 318). Being extremely religious, the foreman feels a deep inner need for a personal relationship with God, thus "he did not notice how he found himself near the chapel" (ibid., p. 319). The narrator notices that even the foreman's praying has changed qualitatively ("for a long time he had prayed without consciousness, without saying a word"), which becomes similar to the contemplation of mystics, when the feelings of space and time disappear – there was simply one clear "Now" in the whole flow of time: "He did not remember himself, but only felt that a light spark appeared from the depths of his existence, which, was going right without any hindrance to God, lighted the following path that led to the eternal fatherhood so brightly". The narrator mentions in the epilogue that the following day the foreman did not feel such all-embracing ecstatic tranquillity, but order and peace were established in his thoughts.

Conclusions

The article focused on the reflections of feelings and experiences of the character in Julijonas Lindė-Dobilas's novel *Blūdas* by analysing the occurring intentional acts and their relationship with the living world; it

was sought to reveal how the process of self-identification and reflection of one's identity of the character are happening through an *Other* (conscience and actions that formed it). The analysis was carried out by using theories of the philosophy of phenomenology. Having performed the analysis, it was noted that an Other becomes especially important in the process of self-identification, however not as another person, but as another part of one's personality – the judging consciousness or conscience. It was notably the critical look at the Other and reflection of one's experiences that helped the character of the novel to better understand one's conscience and assess circumstances that formed it.

References

- Buber, M. (2001). *Dialogo principas II: Dialogas. Klausimas pavieniui. Tarpžmogiškumo pradai*. Vilnius: Katalikų pasaulis.
- Daujotytė, V. (2010). Fenomenologinis žvilgsnis: Jono Biliūno „Kūdikystės sapnai, XX amžiaus literatūros teorijos: konceptualioji kritika, Vilnius: Lietuvių literatūros ir tautosakos institutas.
- Howard, J.J. (2014). *Conscience in Moral Life: Rethinking how Our Convictions Structure Self and Society*. London, New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Jonkus D. (2009). *Patirtis ir refleksija: fenomenologinės filosofijos akiračiai*. Kaunas: Vytauto Didžiojo universitetas.
- Lindė-Dobilas, J. (1990) Blūdas, Julijonas Lindė-Dobilas, *Blūdas*, Lazdynų Pelėda, Klaida. Vilnius: Vaga.
- Merlo-Ponti, M. [Merleau-Ponty] (1980). Suvokimo fenomenologija, *Problemos*, 25, pp. 94-106. Retrieved from: <http://www.zurnalai.vu.lt/problemos/article/view/6282/4014>.
- Natanson, M. (1962). *Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences: Essays in Existentialism and Phenomenology*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Ricoeur P. (1992). *Onself as Another*. Translated by Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

CHAPTER FIVE

PEDAGOGICAL ETHICS IN LIGHT OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL REFLECTION: A FEW INSPIRATIONS FROM MAX VAN MANEN AND POLISH PHENOMENOLOGICAL PEDAGOGY

MARTA KRUPSKA

PEDAGOGICAL UNIVERSITY IN KRAKOW, POLAND

Abstract: This article takes a closer look at some important aspects of pedagogical ethics inspired by phenomenological thought and explores the importance of ethical reflection in van Manen's phenomenological methodology and Polish pedagogical pursuit. Moreover, the work focuses on understanding ethical issues and is a reflection on the possibilities and opportunities offered to contemporary pedagogical studies by the phenomenological approach to discovering ethical dimensions of pedagogical practice. In the article an attempt is made to draw attention to the most fundamental values which we can find in the area of ethical inquiry in phenomenological pedagogy. To investigate the pedagogical quest for meaningfulness and the original meaning of human existence, human freedom and personal development takes its place in the area of ethical reflection. The main part of the article focuses on a few reflections from the research of Professor Andrzej Ryk from Pedagogical University in Kraków.

Key words: phenomenological pedagogy, ethics, rationality of phenomenological pedagogy, upbringing.

Introduction

The development of pedagogical research and reflection should always be guided by deep and appropriate ethical sources of motivation. The development of phenomenological thought and research is connected with the search for an ethics-sensitive language of epistemology of practice that

is guided by interest in the child's experience and the relations between adult and child. A lot of researchers have argued that the most unfortunate fact about contemporary discourses and practices of education is that they have tended to become overly rationalistic and results based (van Manen 2000). Thus, the question is what is the fundamental moral experience which we can find at the roots of our pedagogical practice? Phenomenological pedagogy brings us a great opportunity to contemplate such questions and to try to find practical responses.

The inspiration of phenomenology in the field of pedagogical thought opens the door to a fascinating world. Here is a place for phenomenological invitations to the openness of our inner life. Interest in pedagogical ethics and qualitative research in pedagogy is constantly growing in Poland⁴ as it offers to our practice a few treasures we can find in the process of understanding cognition and the horizon of our encompassing world. Phenomenological pedagogy opens the door to a spiritual and moral reality and shows us how to appreciate the world of our daily lives. It is a way of thinking about our research and it allows researchers a special role in understanding what the act of upbringing is. This is a chance to explore different forms of human expression, especially the world of feelings (Ryk 2011).

Why do we need a phenomenological way of thinking and research for ethical reflection in pedagogical practice? This question is related to our connection with reality and our levels of cognition. It is question about place for spiritual and moral experience in our self-understanding and practice.

⁴ Ryk, A. (2011). *W poszukiwaniu podstaw pedagogiki humanistycznej, Od fenomenologii Husserla do pedagogiki fenomenologicznej*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Impuls.




Fig. 9-1. Inspired by: Ryk 2011, pp. 231.

The openness of phenomenological pedagogy is based above all on meta-pedagogical assumptions. It is mainly a result of Husserl’s assumptions that the world does not have a homogenous nature, but in reality is multifaceted (Ryk 2011); that reality and human beings cannot be reduced to the purely factual dimension, nor to the facts, which are derived from an empirical and materialistic vision of education and child upbringing (ibid.). If we are looking for a source of moral experience we must reflect on one of the most important issues inspired by phenomenology—we must be attentive to the human experience of the encompassing world and on the levels and dimensions of our cognition.

Experience of encompassing world

To emphasize the importance of the phenomenological way of thinking we need to raise to an important question: In what way do we experience the encompassing world in our natural attitude? Phenomenology opens the door to the multidimensional experience.




Fig. 9-2. Inspired by: Ryk 2011, pp. 198.

The first layer it is the world of our daily lives—the world at hand. It is all in our sensual experience. The second layer of the encompassing world is the world of symbols, ideas and notions which is culturally constituted. The person is taking root in the world of notion and it becomes a source of self-understanding and a base for interpreting the encompassing world. However for phenomenological pedagogy every system of notion has its own horizon, from which it arises. A consolidated system of understanding becomes a starting point to deeper self-understanding and participation in our human experience (Ryk 2011).

The third layer of person acting horizon is marked by all that we cannot comprehend in from our sensual experience and we cannot comprehend (“catch”) in our intellectual concepts and categories. It is the area of intuition and desires. We stand above and beyond the pure intellectual and factual dimension of our cognition (ibid.). We stand opposite our existence, our questions for our identity and our moral concerns.

Understanding pedagogical rationality—ethical dimension of cognition

For ethical reflections a question about clear “understanding of pedagogical rationality” is very important. As noted by Andrzej Ryk

(2011, pp. 194), the crisis of pedagogy is a result of inappropriate understanding of this matter, which contains the experience of what we call *child upbringing* as well as the understanding of this experience. The rationality of phenomenological pedagogy derives above all from the conviction that every kind of pedagogical activity is an act that is spiritual nature. Then, the fundamental task of phenomenological pedagogy is to reveal the identity of spiritual reality. The fundamental task is the universe of spirit as a reality which antecedes every kind of action (Ryk 2011). It is an act of true responsibility, because it becomes a real concern for humanity.

Phenomenological pedagogy makes the human spirit the field of systematic experience and research. As a crucial task, it desires to explain possible relations between various perspectives on the teacher and the student, particularly thinking about the understanding of each other in a spiritual dimension, as well the surrounding world, which encompasses them and the self-evident nature of their experience (ibid.). It is a place where we are looking for the truth. The rationality of phenomenological pedagogy opens the space of values and it becomes a very responsible *action*.

The act of self-understanding

Phenomenological pedagogy leads us to a profound awareness of the true meaningful activity in the process of upbringing is the act of self-understanding. This act is constantly immersed in the process of changes in the encompassing world; however for phenomenological pedagogy, self-understanding becomes a crucial category, which is the foundation of its identity (Ryk 2011).

The acting person who is engaged in the process needs to perform in a way that is true to their natural attitude to their life. The subject builds the way of self-understanding which cannot be extracted from himself, but always being in a certain manner of self-understanding As underlined by Ryk, it seems that this category is unacknowledged as an essential in contemporary pedagogy (ibid.).

The way of self-understanding creates the conditions for authentic encounters and becomes a space where the teacher's and child's life worlds interpenetrate each other. As underlined by Max van Manen, the concept of pedagogy embodies the necessity to reach a deeper understanding of children or young people. Indeed, mature awareness of the adult person implies distinguishing between what is appropriate or inappropriate, good or bad, right or wrong, suitable or less suitable for

children (van Manen 1994). Thus, ethical experience is at the core of the child's development and the deep personal maturity of the adult person. The thoughts of Max van Manen opens for us deeply humanistic dimensions and reveals pedagogy as a form of inquiry which implies that one has the relational knowledge of children: how young people experience things, what they think about, how they look at the world, what they do, and, most importantly, what kind of factors distinguishes that particular child as a unique person. A teacher who does not understand the inner life of the child is unable to recognize their individual self (ibid.). Similarly, Polish researcher Andrzej Ryk indicates that in the area of pedagogy we can observe deep inner dependency between the act of self understanding of the teacher and his or her ability to recognize the inner life of the child. This mutual encounter reveals a sense of the true (Ryk 2011).

I am a moral reality—phenomenological pedagogy as a door to the reality of first-person experience

Phenomenological pedagogy brings us the opportunity to obtain access to the inner ethical experience. The issue of self-exploration is one of the fundamental in phenomenological pedagogy because it provides the opportunity to discover a human identity. Also, it is a unique possibility to discover a persons' own individuality and a personal meaning of the history of his life. It opens the unique space in which the past, the present and the future collides with each other. Biographic and autobiographic studies include infinite numbers of perspectives from which we try to reach personal experience. An expression of our desires and aspirations is an important part of pedagogical practice and what is worth underlining is from that position we can look into our life (Ryk 2011). Real insight into the history of our lives reveals their deep ethical meaning.

The second dimension of analysis is the question of how a person is acting in the meeting with himself in connection with the exploration of their images and perceptions. Formations of plans and aspirations as well as dreams always inspires us to undertake further development and are closely connected with our moral expectations. The third dimension of analysis comprises multidimensional experiences of the encompassing world (ibid.). This experience also reveals strong ethical meaning in our understanding and in our human way of being in the world.




Fig. 9-3. Inspired by: Ryk 2011, pp.196-197.

Discovery of the spiritual and ethical dimension of personal history provides us with a chance to discover our inner world and it becomes a source of our moral practice. So, at the roots of our moral experience we meet ourselves and our boundaries with reality.

The world of feelings

The world of feelings reveals the self-evident nature of pedagogical reality. Together with the inner development of a person's upbringing becomes the space of ethical experience. Phenomenological pedagogy does not set goals of upbringing *a priori* (Ryk, 2011, p.199).

In phenomenological pedagogy the educator and the student present their own way of understanding reality. They are able to distinguish the meaning which is revealed by them and the meaning which is revealed beyond them. Then the act of upbringing becomes an act in which the world of feelings and experiences of teacher and student penetrate each other in the perspective on the horizon of the encompassing world in its multidimensional character (ibid.). The feelings reveal the self-evident nature of the reality.

Deep mutual relations between the world of feelings and the goals of upbringing in phenomenological pedagogy become the space of ethical experience:

The ethical importance of the world of feeling and the goals of phenomenological pedagogy		
The goals are present in horizon of experience and feeling	The goal is rather an action, it is an act of spiritual self understanding	The verification of its goals is always immanent matter. It is an act of spiritual reflection, which result in revealing the sens.

Fig. 9-4. Inspired by: Ryk 2011, pp. 199-200

van Manen (2000) emphasizes that we need to ask what it would mean if adults were treated as moral agents. In the search for a response we need a moral language. As he wrote, a result of this vacuum in this field it is difficult to name the problems that we have, to break out of our primitive discourse, to hold profound conversations and to teach a moral language to children. He confirm, that such language needs to be sensitive to the way that pedagogical relations are lived and experienced.

The ethical dimension of community with others

The pedagogical relations may help us better understand the virtues and qualities that are at the heart of teaching (van Manen 1994). From the teacher's point of view the phenomenological pedagogy opens the door to many valuable possibilities. Some people possess especially sensitive insight into human nature. It is a kind of wisdom about how people are and how they tend to act in specific situations. It is about the significance of our fragility, strengths, difficulties, inclinations and life circumstances; it is a practical knowledge of how people's actions relate to motives, intentions, feelings, and moods (ibid.). Such practical knowledge is great chance for activating a process of creative and moral mutual development among teachers and students. Such practical knowledge is a space for ethical encounters.

As van Manen emphasizes (2000), in the search for the source of ethical experiences we may need to bypass conceptual and cognitive models in favour of more literary and imaginary sources that stay attentive to ethical experience. In literature and in all art the image of human experience is not reduced to the concept, but it is deep rooted in the in our

true life experience. In the search for truly mature pedagogical awareness it is useful to work with narratives that are emotionally complex and that offer us some understanding of the meaning of reality and community with others that, is unmediated by conceptualization.

van Manen, as well as Ryk indicate that the concept of pedagogy includes an animating ethos (Ryk 2011; Van Manen 1994). As van Manen underlines, pedagogue has personal commitment and interest in the child's development and growth toward true maturity. He consistently emphasizes that teaching requires not only a complex knowledge base but also the improvisational immediacy, and care for normative dimensions in pedagogical practice and for pedagogical thoughtfulness (van Manen 1994). This care for normative dimensions in pedagogical theory and practice is strongly present in the pedagogical research of Andrzej Ryk in Poland.

Conclusions

We constantly betray the call of live ethical experience as wrote Max van Manen (van Manen 2000). It is very close to the Polish quest in the area of phenomenological pedagogy. The problems with recognizing the normative, ethical or moral nature of our practice confront us with the most important concerns and desires of our human condition. Thanks to this we have a chance to discover deep meaning in our research. First and foremost, we have a chance to discover the true meaning of interpersonal relations and human responsibility.

At the core of pedagogical practice still is the ethical experience of pedagogical relation. The question about the true meaning of experience of encompassing world and about the way of understanding of pedagogical rationality and ethical dimension of cognition try helping us to approach to our human condition. Thanks to this we can become more and more open to all, which could reveal deep nature of relation between us. Profound awareness of true meaning of the act of self-understanding, deep access to the human world of feeling and to the first person experience is a unique possibility for real community with others. Phenomenological thinking in Poland constantly confirms that deep awareness and the ethical dimension of community with others becomes the most important dimensions of community with our individual selves.

References

Ryk, A. (2011), *W poszukiwaniu podstaw pedagogiki humanistycznej, Od*

- fenomenologii Husserla do pedagogiki fenomenologicznej*,
Kraków: Wydawnictwo Impuls.
- (201). *W poszukiwaniu podstaw badań ejdetycznych w perspektywie fenomenologicznej na podstawie koncepcji Edmunda Husserla*,
Kraków: Wydawnictwo Impuls.
- Van Manen, M. (1994). *Pedagogy, Virtue and Narrative Identity in Teaching*, *Curriculum Inquiry*, 4, 135 – 170.
- (2000). Moral language and pedagogical experience, *The Journal of Curriculum Studies*, (32) 2.
- (1997). *Researching Lived Experience: Human Science for an Action Sensitive Pedagogy*, London, Ont.: Althouse Press.
- (1991). *The Tact of Teaching: The Meaning of Pedagogical Thoughtfulness*. London, Ont.: Althouse Press.
- Van Manen, M. & Levering, B. (1996). *Childhood's Secrets: Intimacy, Privacy, and the Self Reconsidered*. New York: Teachers College Press.

CONTRIBUTORS

Cristiana Barbierato – PhD student of Education Sciences at Vilnius University, Faculty of Social Sciences. Her research interests cover the topic of teacher authority as a positive phenomenon contributing to the student's growth. Cristiana is interested in eidetic phenomenology and its application in the field of education; she follows discussions and research development in Italian context. For more than 20 years she has been working as an Italian language teacher in schools and higher education institutions both in Italy and Lithuania.

E-mail: cristianabarbierato@yahoo.it

Skaistė Barkutė – PhD candidate in the humanities (philology) of the Faculty of Humanities and Educational Sciences at Klaipėda University. Research interests: Lithuanian literature (19th century and the first half of the 20th century), moral philosophy and literature, conscience in literature, literary sociology, literary theology, and literary phenomenology.

E-mail: sbarkute@yahoo.it

Dr. Aleksandra Batuchina – has a PhD in Educational Sciences (Social Sciences) and works as a lecturer at Klaipėda University, the Department of Social Geography. Aleksandra has an experience in conducting research in the field of migration, labour migration and migrant integration, evaluation of the living and working conditions of migrants, as well as intercultural communication. Aleksandra's interests are qualitative research strategies, especially phenomenology as methodology and its variations. Her PhD thesis "Phenomenological Research on children's migrating" was one of the first phenomenological dissertations in the field of Educational Sciences in Lithuania.

E-mail: aleksandra.ro@gmail.com

Assoc. Prof. Oded Ben-Horin – coordinator of the Global Science Opera initiative and co-developer of the "Global Science Opera" concept. He was a Project Coordinator of the EU Comenius project "Implementing Creative Strategies into Science Teaching" (CREAT-IT), 2013-15. Together with Prof. Magne Espeland, Oded has developed the "Write a Science Opera" (WASO) educational methodology. Oded is a PhD candidate of Music Pedagogy at the University of Bergen. As an artist (librettist, jazz vocalist, composer), Oded has collaborated with leading

international science institutions to produce music and contribute to creative public outreach. Since May 2015 Oded has been a member of the European Network for Opera and Dance Education (RESEO) Steering Committee.

E-mail: oded.ben@hvl.no

Marta Krupska – graduate student at Ignatianum - the University School of Philosophy and Education in Kraków. Her major is pedagogy and philosophy, and currently she is a PhD candidate at the Pedagogical University in Kraków. Her research is closely connected with contemporary phenomenological pedagogy and philosophy. Currently Marta is working on the first broad Polish study on Max van Manen's achievements within the scope of phenomenological pedagogy. She consistently updates her knowledge on pedagogical relations and mutual dialogues among philosophy, pedagogy, and humanistic psychiatry and psychotherapy. Marta has a network of academic connections worldwide and collaborates with her colleagues.

E-mail: mkrupska@interia.pl

Agnė Kudarauskienė – PhD Student in education in Vytautas Magnus university with skills and interest in hermeneutic phenomenological inquiry as well as an experienced manager of education, in HE & VET (higher education & vocational education and training). Her doctoral phenomenological study is focused on fundamental existential themes which pervade the lifeworld of university professors. She developed her competencies of phenomenological inquiry in Prof. Max van Manen's workshop "Phenomenological Inquiry and 50 IHSRC'2017_Poland Writing", in scientific conference and workshop "Phenomenology of Practice" in Capital Normal university, Beijing. She was a founder and organizer of first international scientific-practical phenomenological conference and workshop "Phenomenology of Practice in Practice. International Interdisciplinary Conference of Phenomenological Research in Human Sciences" in Kaunas, September 2016.

E-mail: kudarauskieneagne@gmail.com

Prof. Gintautas Mažeikis – Professor at the Department of Philosophy and Social Critique at Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania. One of Gintautas' interest fields is drawing on the links among existential phenomenology, critical theory, and post-structuralism. He researches the Soviet and post-Soviet living world: its consciousness, communication and

world-experiences. He analyses the philosophical-anthropological questions, human and post-human conditions, based on ideology analysis, politics, disciplines and regimes, imaginations, activism, and the forms of communication. Gintautas' research encompasses the development and transformations of the ideological or propaganda-affected people in everyday life and extreme situations; he analyses the contradictions within the ideological transformations of public spheres, forms of activisms and negative praxis of humiliation, manipulation, alienation, and coercive transformation of people. Apart from his existential-phenomenological and critical theory approaches, Gintautas takes interest in interdisciplinary and practical topics, such as researche based on anthropological and sociological interviews and data, literature and film studies, and the criticism of contemporary creative/cultural industries.

E-mail: gintautas.mazeikis@vdu.lt

Dr. Giedrė Strakšienė – researcher at Klaipėda University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Social Sciences Research Centre, Lithuania. Giedrė is a lecturer at the Departments of Music and Philology. Giedrė's academic and research areas are: the development of communicative competence, integrated learning of subjects, including the role of communicative competences, various teaching and learning drama methods applicable in the development of intercultural communicative competence, the theory and methodology of social research, and social-educational initiatives. She has a PhD in Education Sciences (Social Sciences).

E-mail: giedre.straksiene@ku.lt